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Abstract 
The upheavals in the Arab world since 2011 have led to civil wars in three 
countries: Libya, Syria and Yemen. In all three cases, the United Nations 
have tried to mediate agreements between the conflicting parties to bring 
about peace through power-sharing. In this endeavour, the UN can lean 
on its broad experience in mediation efforts to end civil wars. 
In the three conflicts examined here, however, the UN’s attempts at reso-
lution through power-sharing have failed. In Yemen and Libya, power-shar-
ing agreements have not prevented conflicts from lingering on or violence 
from breaking out again. In Syria, the UN has not even managed to bring 
together the Syrian parties in the civil war for direct talks. The altered mili-
tary balance of power has rendered the initial goal of a political transition 
unrealistic. 
This study answers the following questions: Why are these three conflicts 
so resistant to resolution efforts? What are the specific aspects of the conflict 
configurations that impede UN efforts? What factors in the UN approach are 
obstacles to a successful conclusion? What lessons can be learned for future 
mediation efforts? And how can Europe contribute to progress in this area? 
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Issues and Recommendations 
Mission Impossible? 
UN Mediation in Libya, Syria and Yemen 
The upheavals in the Arab world since 2011 have 
led to civil wars in three countries: Libya, Syria and 
Yemen. In all three cases, the United Nations (UN) are 
trying to mediate agreements between parties in the 
conflicts to bring about peace through power-sharing. 
The UN has an established leadership role in media-
tion efforts to end civil wars. Since the 1990s, some 
of the most protracted civil wars have been settled 
under the UN’s overall command or with its partici-
pation. Most of these negotiated settlements were 
based on power-sharing agreements. 
Not so for the three conflicts analysed here: all 
UN efforts to end them through power-sharing have 
failed. In Yemen and Libya, power-sharing agree-
ments have not prevented conflicts from continuing 
or resuming. In Syria, the UN has not even managed 
to hold direct negotiations on power-sharing between 
the parties in the civil war. The changed military 
balance of power has now made the initial goal of a 
political transition unrealistic. 
Why are these three conflicts so resistant to reso-
lution efforts? Which aspects of these conflicts im-
pede UN efforts? Which factors in the UN approach 
hinder progress? What lessons can be learned for 
future mediation efforts? And how can Europeans 
help to move the UN’s attempts at mediation for-
wards? 
The conditions under which the UN is trying to 
negotiate a resolution to the three conflicts are extra-
ordinarily difficult. In all three conflicts, the balance 
of power and alliances between multiple actors change 
constantly. Many local actors in these conflicts are 
not seriously committed to negotiations because they 
receive support from regional and great powers. All 
three conflicts are not only power struggles between 
local forces, but also offer an arena to rival foreign 
powers. This international dimension makes it more 
difficult to include all relevant local and external 
actors in the negotiations, because powerful states 
resist this. Furthermore, UN mediators are constrained 
by a Security Council (SC) that either disagrees about 
the right way to solve the conflict (as for Syria) or 
has associated itself with one party in the conflict (as 
in Yemen), which rules out the UN as an impartial 
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mediator. Finally, enforcing agreements through 
peacekeeping forces was never a realistic option 
in these three countries – not only because there 
was no unanimous support from the five permanent 
members of the SC, but also because the majority 
of local actors in these conflicts reject the presence 
of international peacekeepers. Taken together, this 
meant that, from the outset, the UN’s efforts to bring 
about a negotiated settlement had only a very small 
chance of success – particularly in Syria. 
However, alongside these adverse conditions, mis-
takes and dilemmas in the mediation strategy itself as 
well as a lack of support from Western governments 
have also inhibited success. In Syria, the interests of 
regional and great powers thwarted negotiations that 
would have included all relevant parties, but in Libya 
and Yemen, UN mediators failed to involve important 
conflict parties in the talks. In both cases, the (inevi-
tably unsustainable) agreements were pushed through 
with excessive haste. Insufficient support from local 
actors was offset by international legitimacy, gained 
from Security Council resolutions. At the time of 
signing, the agreements were seen as risky gambles, 
but during the unsuccessful attempts to implement 
them, it became clear that external actors either had 
little leverage over the conflicting parties, or failed to 
use the leverage they had. The use of targeted sanc-
tions to deter potential spoilers in Libya and Yemen 
was particularly ineffective, if not counterproductive. 
Insufficiently inclusive agreements, combined with 
the subsequent failure to enforce them, led the unity 
governments of Libya and Yemen to become mere 
parties to the conflict. The UN thus turned from 
mediator to supporter of one side. In Syria, UN sanc-
tions and other coercive measures to influence con-
flict parties were out of the question anyway, due to 
the polarisation of the Security Council. Above all, 
however, Western governments were not prepared to 
exert serious pressure on the regional states that were 
key in preventing a negotiated solution or its imple-
mentation in all three countries. 
The conclusion obviously cannot be that it is futile 
to mediate in similarly complex future conflicts. 
Rather, the question is how mediation efforts can 
become more effective. The cases addressed here offer 
three conclusions. First, the mandate should not be 
limited to mediating between the local parties in a 
civil war. Instead, from the outset it should also pro-
vide forums that allow for the reconciliation of the 
competing interests of relevant regional and great 
powers, or at least enable the UN to influence the 
rules of engagement in the conflict. Second, power-
sharing agreements should be sufficiently inclusive; 
the negotiations should bring together actors who are 
truly representative of the political forces and con-
stituencies on the ground; and the agreements should 
give these parties sufficient incentives to abide by the 
deal. Third, UN mediators should avoid taking sides 
in favour of unity governments if those governments 
themselves become parties to the conflict and under-
mine agreements. 
Europeans often have little influence on the inter-
national power relations that constrain UN mediators. 
Nevertheless, they can help by refraining from doing 
anything that might undermine UN mediation efforts, 
such as circumventing sanctions or directly cooperat-
ing with conflict actors to pursue aims unrelated to a 
negotiated solution. Furthermore, for as long as UN 
missions do not have the mandate to reconcile com-
peting regional and international interests, they 
should use their channels of dialogue with regional 
and major powers towards avoiding further escala-
tion, establishing rules of engagement and focusing 
on protecting civilians. 
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The civil wars in Libya, Syria and Yemen are extremely 
complex in terms of the configuration of local actors, 
the military involvement of regional and great pow-
ers, and the dynamic formation of alliances.1 But the 
three cases also raise general questions: when do 
negotiated settlements succeed in ending civil wars, 
and under what conditions can the UN successfully 
mediate peace agreements and guarantee their 
implementation? Previous cases allow us to draw a 
number of lessons and outline points of contention 
with regard to the roles of conflict dynamics, the 
mediation strategy, and the UN Security Council. 
Conditions for Successful Mediation 
There is no agreement on whether or not conflict 
dynamics can make a civil war ripe for resolution or 
ensure that all negotiations will fail in the absence of 
ripeness. According to an influential thesis, success-
ful conflict resolution requires a stalemate between 
the conflicting parties in which the costs of continu-
ing conflict exceed those of making concessions for a 
peace agreement.2 But whether a conflict had reached 
this stage often only becomes clear in retrospect. The 
expectation that a civil war will be ripe for resolution 
at some future point is not only questionable because 
it can serve as a convenient pretext for insufficient 
efforts at mediation, but also because many civil wars 
come no closer to a solution as they grind on; rather, 
they produce ever new conflicts, as well as new actors 
and war profiteers with a strong interest in continu-
ing conflict. 
Clearly, however, a negotiated settlement will re-
main out of reach as long as the military balance of 
power changes rapidly or conflict parties can count 
 
1 See also the overview of the military involvement of third 
parties in the three conflicts, pp. 11ff. 
2 I. William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution (New York, 1985). 
on sustained foreign backing – in other words, as 
long as one or more conflict parties expects to make 
military gains. Mediation efforts themselves can con-
tribute to the formation of new alliances among those 
who oppose an agreement, thereby provoking escala-
tion. The decisive role of external support, in turn, 
explains why, during the Cold War, civil wars – most 
of which were then also proxy wars – rarely ended 
through negotiated settlements, and why the “uni-
polar moment” of the 1990s set in motion a series 
of peace agreements for old and new conflicts.3 How-
ever, even during this heyday for conflict settlements, 
only a quarter of mediation attempts produced an 
agreement, and only a fraction of these agreements 
saw implementation.4 By contrast, the growing multi-
polar disorder of recent years offers far more difficult 
conditions for conflict resolution. It drives a growing 
internationalisation of civil wars – an increasing 
number of great and regional powers are now in-
volved5 – and a trend towards fragmented conflict 
landscapes: instead of binary struggles between a 
government and a rebel movement, we increasingly 
see multi-party conflicts in which continuously 
changing alliances prevent the emergence of a stale-
mate.6 The three conflicts this study focuses on are 
prime examples for this development. 
 
3 Lise Howard and Alexandra Stark, “How Civil Wars End. 
The International System, Norms, and the Role of External 
Actors”, International Security 42, no. 3 (2017/18): 127–71. 
4 Virginia Fortna, Peace Time. Cease-Fire Agreements and the 
Durability of Peace (Princeton, 2004). 
5 Sebastian von Einsiedel, Civil War Trends and the Changing 
Nature of Armed Conflict, Occasional Paper 10 (Tokyo: United 
Nations University Centre for Policy Research, March 2017), 
https://collections.unu.edu/eserv/UNU:6156/Civil_war_trends_ 
UPDATED.pdf (accessed 16 May 2018). 
6 Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, Understanding Fragmen-
tation in Conflict and Its Impact on Prospects for Peace, Oslo Forum 
Paper 6 (Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Decem-
ber 2016), https://www.hdcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
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Which mediation strategy is successful depends not 
only on the configuration of the conflict, but also on 
the characteristics of the mediator. Mediators with 
little leverage – such as representatives of small 
states or non-governmental organisations – have 
to convince conflict parties that they are absolutely 
impartial. Their strategy will necessarily focus on 
creating trust between the conflicting parties. By con-
trast, a mediator who represents world powers and 
can bring their influence to bear will rely more on 
international pressure to prod the conflict parties 
towards compromise, and on third-state guarantees 
to ensure the implementation of an agreement.7 
Mediation based on such “manipulation” of the bal-
ance of power aims either to bring about a stalemate 
or to demonstrate to the conflict parties that they 
have already reached a stalemate.8 
Either way, the minimum requirement is that the 
conflict parties agree to mediation. It is also impor-
tant that all relevant conflict actors and their external 
supporters are directly or indirectly involved in the 
talks. There are two reasons why this has also become 
more challenging in recent years. First, the growing 
internationalisation of conflicts increases the number 
of external actors who need to sit at the negotiating 
table – and who will try to exclude other local or 
external actors. Second, jihadi groups have played an 
ever greater role in recent civil wars. They show little 
willingness to engage in talks, and their participation 
in negotiations remains an international taboo.9 
 
2017/02/Understanding-fragmentation-in-conflict.pdf 
(accessed 16 May 2018). 
7 Kyle Beardsley, “Using the Right Tool for the Job: Media-
tor Leverage and Conflict Resolution”, Penn State Journal of 
Law & International Affairs 2, no. 1 (2013): 57–65; Lindsay 
Reid, “Finding a Peace That Lasts: Mediator Leverage and the 
Durable Resolution of Civil Wars”, Journal of Conflict Resolution 
61, no. 7 (2017): 1401–31. 
8 William Zartman, “Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate 
and Beyond”, in International Conflict Resolution after the Cold 
War, ed. Paul Stern and Daniel Druckman (Washington, 
D.C., 2000), 225–50; Allard Duursma, “A Current Literature 
Review of International Mediation”, International Journal of 
Conflict Management 25, no. 1 (2014): 81–98; Nita Yawana-
rajah, “Ripe, Ready or Strategic? The Timing of Peace Initia-
tives”, Oxford Research Group, October 2016, http://www. 
oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/articles_multimedia/
ripe_ready_or_strategic_timing_peace_initiatives (accessed 
16 May 2018). 
9 Véronique Dudouet, Mediating Peace with Proscribed Armed 
Groups, Special Report 239 (Washington, D.C.: United States 
Institute of Peace [USIP], May 2010), https://www.usip.org/ 
Wherever the UN mediates, the approach pursued 
by mediators and its efficacy depend greatly on the 
Security Council. For UN mediation to be successful, a 
whole series of conditions have to be met. The Secu-
rity Council has to provide the mediator with a clear 
mandate, but above all it has to be united in its sup-
port for the mediation efforts and its interest in 
solving the conflict. The mediator also depends on 
the permanent members to back an agreement with 
guarantees – such as the UN or third states deploying 
troops – and threaten transgressors with sanctions. 
When these conditions are not met, even experienced 
UN mediators find it difficult to negotiate viable 
agreements.10 Finally, the UN Security Council’s posi-
tion on a conflict determines whether the mediator 
can gain a reputation for impartiality, or is seen as 
biased towards one party in the conflict. 
Peace through Power-Sharing? 
Negotiated solutions to civil wars are notoriously 
fragile. It is well-established that when a civil war 
has ended with a negotiated settlement, a resumption 
of conflict is much more likely than if it has ended 
with a military victory by one side.11 It is the subject 
of lively debate under what conditions peace agree-
ments survive or collapse. The debate particularly 
revolves around the issue of whether certain types 
of power-sharing agreement are more robust than 
others, or whether it is the conditions under which 
the power-sharing agreement was concluded that are 
crucial.12 Clearly, however, there is no straightfor-
 
sites/default/files/SR239Duduoet.pdf (accessed 16 May 2018); 
Howard and Stark, “How Civil Wars End” (see note 3); 
Barbara Walter, “New Civil Wars”, Annual Review of Political 
Science 20 (2017): 469–86. 
10 Fen Hampson, “Can the UN Still Mediate?”, in The United 
Nations and Global Security, ed. Richard Price and Mark Zacher 
(London, 2004), 75–92; Kyle Beardsley, “The UN at the Peace-
making-Peacebuilding Nexus”, Conflict Management and Peace 
Science 30, no. 4 (2013): 369–86. 
11 Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, Charting the Roads to 
Peace. Facts, Figures and Trends in Conflict Resolution, Mediation 
Data Trends Report 2007 (Geneva, 2007), http://www. 
conflictrecovery.org/bin/oslo_charting_FINAL.pdf (accessed 12 
March 2018). 
12 Caroline Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie, “Institution-
alizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict 
Management”, in: American Journal of Political Science 47, no. 2 
(2003): 318–32; Karl DeRouen, Jr., Jenna Lea and Peter 
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ward formula for successful peace agreements. Only 
detailed analysis of individual cases allows an in-
formed guess as to whether an agreement has a realis-
tic chance of implementation or is likely to founder. 
Even in the best case, power-sharing agreements re-
main a gamble for the local and international actors 
involved. 
Power-sharing arrangements – whether political, 
military, economic or territorial – have been a com-
ponent of most peace agreements since the 1990s. 
Even when implementation is relatively successful, 
critics question the sustainability of power-sharing 
agreements. They point out that power-sharing agree-
ments signal to political actors that violence pays;13 
that they are more of an obstacle to sustainable con-
flict resolution, since power-sharing usually only 
comes about through massive international commit-
ment, which often declines during implementation;14 
and finally, that they primarily serve the interests 
of power-hungry politicians and warlords without 
addressing the actual causes of conflicts.15 On the last 
point, proponents counter that peace negotiations 
cannot succeed unless they bring together only those 
actors who can cause an agreement to fail.16 Include-
ing a broader range of negotiating parties would 
dilute the influence of such veto players, who would 
therefore also lose interest in a solution. 
As it stands, however, the interests of regional and 
great powers and the exclusion of some groups as ter-
rorists often makes it difficult or even impossible to 
 
Wallensteen, “The Duration of Civil War Peace Agreements”, 
Conflict Management and Peace Science 26, no. 4 (2009): 367–87; 
Thorsten Gromes, Machtteilung nach Bürgerkriegen: Verbreitung 
und Erfolgsbilanz seit 1990, Report 3 (Frankfurt a.M.: Hessische 
Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung [HFSK], 2015), 
https://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/HSFK/hsfk_downloads/ 
report0315.pdf (accessed 16 May 2018). 
13 Denis Tull and Andreas Mehler, “The Hidden Costs of 
Power-Sharing: Reproducing Insurgent Violence in Africa”, 
African Affairs 104, no. 416 (2005): 375–98. 
14 Alex De Waal, “Mission without End? Peacekeeping in 
the African Political Marketplace”, International Affairs 85, 
no. 1 (2009): 99–113; Beardsley, “The UN at the Peace-
making-Peacebuilding Nexus” (see note 10). 
15 Andreas Mehler, “Peace and Power Sharing in Africa: 
A Not So Obvious Relationship”, African Affairs 108, no. 432 
(2009): 453–73; Chandra Sriram and Marie-Joëlle Zahar, 
“The Perils of Power-Sharing: Africa and Beyond”, Africa 
Spectrum 44, no. 3 (2009): 11–39. 
16 David E. Cunningham, “Who Should Be at the Table? 
Veto Players and Peace Processes in Civil War”, Penn State 
Journal of Law & International Affairs 2, no. 1 (2013): 38–47. 
bring all relevant actors to the negotiating table. 
The case studies in this analysis underline this point. 
They also show that the prominent role of external 
powers in these conflicts necessitates a negotiating 
framework that involves both local and international 
actors. It is hardly surprising that such a complex 
undertaking rarely succeeds. Nevertheless, it is worth 
asking whether the configuration of a conflict made 
the failure of UN efforts all but inevitable, or whether 
the mediator’s miscalculations or bias contributed to 
failure. Answering this question will help in devising 
more successful mediation efforts for similarly com-
plex future conflicts. 
With this objective in mind, the following con-
tributions analyse the UN’s mediation strategies in 
Libya, Syria and Yemen against the background of 
these conflicts’ trajectories, and the competing inter-
ests of local, regional and international actors in-
volved in them. The focus is on the following ques-
tions: How do UN mediators deal with the structures 
and dynamics of these conflicts? What are the main 
obstacles to success for the UN’s efforts? What can 
European policymakers do to support UN mediation 
and make it more effective? 
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Overview 1 
Mediation missions 
United Nations Support Mission 
in Libya (UNSMIL) 
The Office of the Special Envoy of 
the Secretary-General for Syria 
(OSE-Syria) 
The Office of the Special Envoy of 
the Secretary-General for Yemen 
(OSESGY) 
Mandate 
Resolution 1973 (March 2011) wel-
comed the appointment of a Special 
Envoy of the UN Secretary-General 
to “find a peaceful and sustainable 
solution” to the crisis in Libya. 
UNSMIL was created by Resolution 
2009 (September 2011). Several 
subsequent Resolutions, most 
recently 2376 (2017), have extended 
the mission mandate for mediation 
and provision of good offices, includ-
ing (since December 2015) supporting 
the implementation of the Libyan 
Political Agreement. 
Mandate 
The Special Envoy of the UN Sec-
retary-General is mandated to bring 
about a conflict settlement on the 
basis of the Geneva Communiqué 
(June 2012) and SC Resolution 2254 
(December 2015). This involves 
establishing a “transitional gov-
erning body” (TGB) from among 
government and opposition repre-
sentatives that will shape the 
political transition to a pluralistic, 
democratic, inclusive Syria. 
 
Predecessor mission: joint LAS/UN 
mediator based on UNGA Resolution  
66/253 (February 2012). 
Mandate 
In April 2011, the UN Secretary-
General appointed a Special Envoy 
for Yemen (without a mandate from 
the Security Council or General 
Assembly) to support with his good 
offices the efforts of the Gulf Co-
operation Council (GCC) in Yemen. 
 
SC Resolution 2014 (October 2011) 
welcomed the Special Envoy’s role 
as a mediator and reaffirmed his 
mandate to support Yemen in its 
political transition in line with the 
GCC initiative. SC Resolution 2216 
(April 2015) called on the UN Secre-
tary-General to intensify the envoy’s 
role. Accordingly, the UN Special 
Envoy was tasked with assisting the 
conflict parties in returning to a 
peaceful process of transition based 
on the GCC initiative, the results of 
the National Dialogue and the rele-
vant Security-Council resolutions. 
Mediator 
Special Representative of the 
UN Secretary-General for Libya: 
 Abdelelah Al-Khatib 
(Special Envoy)  
(07/03/2011 – 20/08/2011) 
 Ian Martin  
(11/09/2011 – 13/10/2012) 
 Tarek Mitri  
(14/10/2012 – 30/09/2014) 
 Bernardino León  
(01/09/2014 – 4/11/2015) 
 Martin Kobler  
(04/11/2015 – 22/06/2017) 
 Ghassan Salamé  
(since 22/06/2017) 
Mediator 
Special Envoy of the UN Sec-
retary-General to Syria: 
 Staffan de Mistura  
(since 10/07/2014) 
 
Joint Special Representative for 
the United Nations and the LAS 
for Syria: 
 Kofi Annan  
(23/02/2012 – 2/08/2012) 
 Lakhdar Brahimi  
(18/08/2012 – 13/05/2014) 
Mediator 
Special Envoy of the UN Sec-
retary-General to Yemen: 
 Jamal Benomar  
(01/04/2011 – 15/04/2015) 
 Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed  
(25/04/2015 – 27/02/2018) 
 Martin Griffiths  
(since 17/02/2018) 
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Overview 2 
Significant Military Involvement of Third Parties 
 Libya Syria Yemen 
Egypt  logistical support, training, 
advice and arms for Khalifa 
Haftar; 
 several airstrikes  
(2015–2017) against armed 
groups or cities which are 
hostile to Haftar. 
–  member of the Saudi-led 
coalition; 
 marine support for the naval 
blockade. 
France  deployment of Special Forces 
and intelligence assistance for 
Khalifa Haftar; 
 Assistance in training the 
Presidential Guard for the 
Serraj government in Tripoli. 
 financial and logistical sup-
port, training for so-called 
moderate rebels and the SDF; 
 Special Forces to support the 
rebels and SDF. 
 logistical support for (and in-
telligence cooperation with) the 
Saudi-led coalition. 
UK  deployment of Special Forces 
in Misrata and intelligence 
assistance there, as well as for 
Khalifa Haftar in Benghazi. 
 financial and logistical sup-
port, training for so-called 
moderate rebels and the SDF; 
 Special Forces to support the 
rebels and SDF. 
 logistical support for (and in-
telligence cooperation with) the 
Saudi-led coalition; deployment 
of military advisors in the 
Operation Room in Riyadh. 
Iran –  financial and logistical sup-
port for the regime and Iran-led 
militias; 
 deployment of military 
advisors, special forces and 
ground troops to support the 
regime; 
 guidance for Iran-led militias 
(esp. Lebanese Hezbollah and 
militias from Iraq, Afghanistan 
and Pakistan). 
 financial support for Houthi 
rebels; 
 possibly arms deliveries, 
incl. long-range missiles; 
 military training for Houthi 
rebels by Hezbollah.  
Israel –  airstrikes against Hezbollah 
positions as well as Iranian and 
Syrian-regime positions, arms 
transports and factories. 
– 
Italy  deployment of military 
advisors and a field hospital 
to support armed groups from 
Misrata fighting IS in Sirte  
(May – December 2016 and 
since); 
 training for the Presidential 
Guard of the Serraj government 
in Tripoli. 
– – 
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Overview 2 (cont.) 
Significant Military Involvement of Third Parties 
 Libya Syria Yemen 
NATO  airstrikes against the Qadhafi 
regime (2011). 
– – 
Russia  no clear evidence for support 
for Khalifa Haftar; possibly 
indirect arms deliveries (via 
Egypt); advice or training pos-
sibly via private companies. 
 financial and logistical sup-
port; arms; military advisors for 
the Assad regime; 
 airstrikes (since September 
2015) against rebels and IS; 
 ground troops and military 
observers monitoring the de-
escalation zones. 
– 
Gulf 
Cooperation 
Council 
states 
 UAE: financial and logistical 
support and arms for Khalifa 
Haftar; 
 UAE: airstrikes in support of 
Haftar’s alliance (August 2014); 
construction of a UAE air-force 
base in eastern Libya for regu-
lar airstrikes in Benghazi and 
Darna (2015-2018); 
 Qatar: financial support for 
Haftar’s opponents; funding of 
arms deliveries via third parties 
(Sudan).  
 Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar: 
financial and logistical support; 
arms; and training for rebels. 
 Saudi-led coalition against 
Houthi rebels with airstrikes, 
ground troops, blockade (since 
March 2015), incl. airstrikes by 
Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Bah-
rain, Kuwait, Morocco, Jordan; 
UAE, Sudan and Qatar ground 
troops; financial and logistical 
support and training for various 
militias by UAE and Saudi 
Arabia. 
 Support also from Somalia 
and Eritrea by providing mili-
tary bases and granting flyover 
rights. 
Turkey  several arms deliveries to 
opponents of Haftar; role of 
Turkish government unclear. 
 financial and logistical sup-
port, arms and training for 
rebels; 
 airstrikes against PYD and IS; 
 ground troops in northern 
Syria (Operation Euphrates 
Shield 2016/17 and Operation 
Olive Branch 2018); military 
observers monitoring the de-
escalation zone in the north. 
– 
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Overview 2 (cont.) 
Significant Military Involvement of Third Parties 
 Libya Syria Yemen 
USA  airstrikes against IS in Sirt 
(August – December 2016) in 
support of armed groups from 
Misrata; 
 Special Forces active in 
Benghazi and Misrata; 
 intelligence cooperation 
with various conflict actors. 
 financial and logistical sup-
port; arms and training for 
so-called moderate rebels 
(2013–2017) and SDF; 
 airstrikes in support of SDF 
offensives against IS; 
 Special Forces to support SDF. 
 airstrikes against AQAP since 
2002; ground operations by 
special forces against AQAP in 
southern Yemen; 
 occasional airstrikes against 
Houthi positions (2017); deploy-
ment of military advisors in 
the Operation Room in Riyadh; 
naval support in the Red Sea, 
logistical assistance and intel-
ligence cooperation with the 
Saudi-led coalition; special 
forces at the Saudi-Yemeni 
border. 
Anti-IS 
Coalition 
–  airstrikes against IS  
(2014–2017). 
– 
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In December 2015, Libyan politicians signed an agree-
ment in Skhirat (Morocco) to form a transitional govern-
ment. The agreement aimed at transcending the 
country’s political divide after the eruption of civil 
war in mid-2014 had put an end to the post-2011 tran-
sitional process. Negotiated under the aegis of the UN, 
the agreement not only had the support of Western 
governments but also of a united UN Security Coun-
cil. The latter declared the Government of National 
Accord (GNA) formed on the basis of the agreement 
to be the only legitimate government of Libya, called 
on member states to cease contact with parallel insti-
tutions, and threatened actors who obstructed the 
agreement’s implementation with sanctions. 
Despite international support, the agreement could 
be considered a failure soon after it was signed. The 
country’s political and institutional divide persists. 
Instead of functioning as a power-sharing arrange-
ment, the GNA has devolved into a façade for the 
capture of state institutions by a handful of Tripoli 
militias. The government as such exerts little author-
ity in Tripoli, let alone beyond the capital city. The 
economic crisis has dramatically worsened since the 
GNA’s formation. Following unsuccessful attempts 
at isolating opponents of the agreement, Western 
governments have resorted to courting the most 
powerful challenger to the GNA: Khalifa Haftar, the 
leader of the so-called Libyan Arab Armed Forces.1 
International efforts at brokering a new political ar-
rangement that would include Haftar have remained 
stuck. 
What explains the failure of the Skhirat agree-
ment, and what are the prospects for negotiating a 
power-sharing deal in Libya? 
 
1 Haftar and his officials also – but less frequently – use 
the term ‘Libyan National Army’. 
Protracted Struggles 
The defining feature of the Libyan conflict landscape 
is its fragmentation. There are few clear fault lines 
or constant actors, and few coherent political-military 
forces – with the exception of Haftar’s. Instead, count-
less armed groups and political actors form ever new 
constellations. The continually changing balance of 
power makes for difficult conditions for negotiations. 
The current conflicts have their origin in the 
2011 revolution. During the civil war, numerous 
revolutionary armed groups formed at the local level. 
Because of their fragmentation, the revolutionary 
forces failed to re-establish central authority after 
the regime’s demise. Rather, successive transitional 
governments were a front for the competition over 
resources between representatives of individual cities 
and groups. One focal point of these rivalries was the 
security sector, where representatives of competing 
factions used their official positions to build up mili-
tias under the guise of state institutions.2 
As the power struggles escalated, actors with 
common enemies gradually formed broader alliances. 
In the summer of 2014, this dynamic resulted in the 
formation of two rival camps and the eruption of a 
civil war whose epicentres were the country’s two 
largest cities. In Benghazi, rampant lawlessness cre-
ated fertile ground for the establishment of a ren-
egade army leadership under Haftar – formerly a 
high-ranking officer under Muammar al-Qadhafi; 
later his adversary in exile; and after the 2011 revo-
lution an openly power-hungry militarist.3 In Ben- 
 
2 See Wolfram Lacher and Peter Cole, Politics by Other Means: 
Conflicting Interests in Libya’s Security Sector, Working Paper 
20 (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, October 2014), http://www. 
smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/F-Working-papers/SAS-
SANA-WP20-Libya-Security-Sector.pdf (accessed 8 March 
2018). 
3 Frederic Wehrey, “Whoever Controls Benghazi Controls 
Libya”, The Atlantic, 1 July 2017; Aidan Lewis, “Veteran Com-
mander Vies for Power in Libya’s Shifting Sands”, Reuters, 
26 February 2018. 
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ghazi, Haftar’s forces fought a coalition of revolution-
ary and jihadi groups. In Tripoli, an alliance of mili-
tias led by forces from Misrata drove its Zintani op-
ponents, who had allied themselves with Haftar, out 
of the capital. A majority of the newly elected House 
of Representatives (HoR) met in the eastern city of 
Tobruk, lent its support to Haftar, and formed a gov-
ernment in nearby al-Baida. A part of the General 
National Congress (GNC), elected in 2012, refused to 
recognise the HoR’s Tobruk sessions and appointed a 
government in Tripoli to represent the forces which 
had just taken control of the capital. 
With the eruption of civil war, the UN Support 
Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) – established in 2011 to 
support the post-Qadhafi transition – began focusing 
on mediating between the conflicting parties to over-
come the political divide. These efforts were initially 
unsuccessful. A first attempt to bring together repre-
sentatives of the HoR in Tobruk with boycotting par-
liamentarians failed in September 2014. The politi-
cal climate was polarised. The Tobruk-based camp 
attacked its opponents as Islamists; they, in turn, 
accused Haftar and the Zintanis of leading a counter-
revolution in league with regime loyalists. Regardless 
of the rhetoric, however, the two camps were politi-
cally too diverse to fit into neat categories.4 
In early 2015, a political and military stalemate 
between the two camps began to emerge. As a result, 
the two opposing alliances disintegrated. The UN-led 
negotiations – now primarily between representa-
tives of the two parliaments – encouraged the grad-
ual dissolution of the state of polarisation. Largely 
independently of the UN-led talks, initiatives by local 
commanders and mediators to negotiate local cease-
fires in western Libya also had an important impact.5 
The military stalemate and persistent political divi-
sions did, however, provide space for Libyan affiliates 
of “Islamic State” (IS) to expand and gradually estab-
lish Sirte as their Libyan headquarters.6 
 
4 Frederic Wehrey and Wolfram Lacher, “Libya’s Legitimacy 
Crisis”, Foreign Affairs, 6 October 2014, https://www.foreign 
affairs.com/articles/middle-east/2014-10-06/libyas-legitimacy-
crisis (accessed 22 May 2018). 
5 Virginie Collombier, “Dialogue, Mediation and Reconcilia-
tion in Libya’s Local Conflicts”, in Inside Wars. Local Dynamics 
of Conflicts in Syria and Libya, ed. Luigi Narbone, Virginie Col-
lombier and Agnès Favier (Florence, 2016), 30–37. 
6 David Kirkpatrick, Ben Hubbard and Eric Schmitt, “ISIS’ 
Grip on Libyan City Gives It a Fallback Option”, New York 
Times, 28 November 2015. 
Despite the fragmentation of the two camps, 
the UN-led talks stuck to a binary framework, the 
principal negotiating parties being the HoR and 
the GNC. From mid-2015 onwards, rifts opened up 
between supporters and opponents of the negotia-
tions, both within these two institutions and in 
individual cities that had previously been clearly 
associated with one or other of the camps. The 
politicians who signed the December 2015 Skhirat 
agreement therefore had shaky power bases. Repre-
sentatives from eastern Libya, Misrata and Zintan 
who held positions in the nine-member Presidency 
Council often faced influential adversaries in their 
own communities. In eastern Libya, where Haftar set 
the agenda, opposition to the agreement prevailed.7 
The GNA’s formation brought about further 
changes in the political landscape. Former Haftar sup-
porters from eastern Libya who had obtained a posi-
tion in the GNA now joined their former enemies in 
opposition to Haftar. Militias from Tripoli that had 
previously been hostile to the “puppet government” 
were now surprisingly pragmatic and exploited their 
new status as pro-GNA forces to move against local 
rivals. Former regime officials, who had been ostra-
cised until the mid-2014 institutional divide, now 
became coveted allies for actors across the political 
spectrum. There was no longer any limit to opportun-
istic side-switching. During the same period, “Islamic 
State” disappeared as a prominent actor. Misratan 
militias, though divided in their attitudes towards the 
GNA, united against IS in Sirte. After several months 
of fighting, they received support in the form of sus-
tained US airstrikes; by late 2016, IS was destroyed as 
a territorial force in Libya.8 
The political survival of the 
Presidency Council is exclusively due 
to international recognition. 
The GNA remained too weak politically to act as a 
magnet for rival factions. One reason was that it was 
a unity government in name only: two of the nine 
 
7 International Crisis Group (ICG), The Libyan Political Agree-
ment: Time for a Reset, Middle East and North Africa Report 
no. 170 (Brussels, 4 November 2016), https://d2071andvip0wj. 
cloudfront.net/170-the-libyan-political-agreement.pdf (ac-
cessed 8 March 2018). 
8 Frederic Wehrey and Wolfram Lacher, “Libya after ISIS”, 
Foreign Affairs, 22 February 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs. 
com/articles/libya/2017-02-22/libya-after-isis (accessed 22 May 
2018). 
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members of the Presidency Council began to boycott 
its meetings a mere month after the agreement was 
concluded; a third stepped down after a year; the 
remaining six were conspicuous mainly through their 
public spats and lack of cooperation.9 A second major 
weakness of the Presidency Council was that the 
Central Bank initially granted it only limited access 
to funds. Serraj, who increasingly monopolised the 
scarce resources and decision-making powers of the 
Presidency Council, gradually built up a precarious 
clientelist structure of rival politicians and militia 
leaders over whom he had no real control. Instead, 
the government increasingly came under the influ-
ence of a handful of militias that divided up Tripoli 
between themselves.10 The political survival of the 
Presidency Council was exclusively due to inter-
national recognition. 
Throughout all twists and turns of Libya’s conflicts, 
Haftar was the only actor who steadily consolidated 
his power structure and expanded his territory. His 
alliance was initially very loose; many of his allies 
hoped to turn on him when they would no longer 
need him. But against such calculations, Haftar grad-
ually eliminated all of his disloyal associates. His 
seizure of the eastern oil ports in September 2016 
marked the definitive failure of attempts to under-
mine him by integrating rival figures from eastern 
Libya into the GNA.11 
A Regional Playing Field without Rules 
Haftar owes his continuous ascent principally to 
levels of foreign support that no other actor in Libya’s 
conflicts enjoys. Military and political backing from 
Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) allowed 
Haftar to put up tenacious resistance to the Skhirat 
agreement and bet on long-term military gains 
against his opponents. 
The Egyptian and Emirati support for Haftar is 
rooted in the regional antagonisms that developed 
after the overthrow of Egyptian President Morsi in 
July 2013: Haftar’s declared goal of “eradicating” the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Libya resonated in Cairo and 
 
9 ICG, The Libyan Political Agreement (see note 7). 
10 Wolfram Lacher, Tripoli’s Militia Cartel. How Ill-Conceived 
Stabilisation Blocks Political Progress, and Risks Renewed War, 
SWP Comment 20/2018 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, April 2018). 
11 ICG, The Libyan Political Agreement (see note 7). 
Abu Dhabi.12 The oft-repeated accusations by Haftar 
and his allies that Qatar, Sudan and Turkey supported 
Libyan Islamists may also have encouraged the Emir-
ati leadership to intervene. However, there is only 
sparse evidence for such assistance to Haftar’s oppo-
nents. The extensive and barely concealed Emirati 
and Egyptian support for Haftar is far disproportion-
ate to the few indications of Turkish and Sudanese 
arms deliveries or Qatari payments to Haftar’s adver-
saries. 
For regional powers, Libya in 2014 became a play-
ing field in which no rules applied. The Emirates and 
Egypt delivered heavy equipment to Haftar, in fla-
grant breach of the UN arms embargo.13 In mid-2014, 
the Emirates launched airstrikes on militia positions 
in Tripoli without ever admitting it – and without 
even consulting the US, let alone European govern-
ments.14 In subsequent years, the Emiratis secretly 
constructed an air base in eastern Libya from which 
they regularly launched strikes on Haftar’s oppo-
nents.15 In 2016 and 2017, there were at least three 
strikes by unknown attackers; in each case, the only 
plausible explanation is that they were Egyptian or 
Emirati aircraft.16 Neither the Libyan authorities nor 
Western governments or international organisations 
have so far been able, or willing, to identify the states 
responsible. 
 
12 “General Khalifa Haftar: My Goal Is to Cleanse Libya 
of Muslim Brothers and Oppressors” (in Arabic), Al-Sharq 
al-Awsat, 20 May 2014; “Haftar: No Leniency in Eradicating 
Muslim Brotherhood” (in Arabic), Al-Ahram, 7 July 2014. 
13 UN Security Council, Final Report of the Panel of Experts 
in Accordance with Paragraph 24 (d) of Resolution 2213 (2015), 
S/2016/209, 4 March 2016. 
14 David Kirkpatrick and Eric Schmitt, “Arab Nations Strike 
in Libya, Surprising U.S.”, New York Times, 25 August 2014. 
15 UN Security Council, Final Report of the Panel of Experts in 
Accordance with Paragraph 13 of Resolution 2278 (2016), S/2017/ 
466, 1 June 2017. 
16 In addition, an unidentified aircraft – most likely a CIA 
drone – carried out at least one targeted strike in Ubari in 
2018. Joe Penney, Eric Schmitt, Rukmini Callimachi and 
Christoph Koettl, “C.I.A. Drone Mission, Curtailed by Obama, 
Is Expanded in Africa Under Trump”, New York Times, 9 Sep-
tember 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/09/world/ 
africa/cia-drones-africa-military.html (accessed 27 September 
2018); “Unidentified Aircraft Bombs Libya’s Derna, 3 Dead – 
Witness”, Reuters, 7 February 2016; UN Security Council, Final 
Report of the Panel of Experts (see note 15), 35; “Libya: 16 Civil-
ians Killed in Derna Airstrikes”, Human Rights Watch, 5 No-
vember 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/11/05/libya-16-
civilians-killed-derna-airstrikes (accessed 8 March 2018). 
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While Libya’s neighbours to the west, Algeria and 
Tunisia, supported the Skhirat talks, the UN Special 
Representatives Bernardino Léon (September 2014 – 
November 2015) and Martin Kobler (November 
2015 – June 2017) could only bring their Egyptian 
and Emirati interlocutors to pay lip service to the 
agreement. Both states clearly put their support for 
Haftar above efforts for a negotiated solution. With-
out this support, Haftar’s stubborn rejectionism 
would have been unthinkable and a power-sharing 
agreement would have had a realistic chance of suc-
cess. The Egyptian and Emirati role was thus key to 
the failure of UN efforts. 
The Growth of Vested International 
Interests 
If Egypt and the UAE were able to obstruct inter-
national efforts, this was not least because Western 
governments were unwilling or unable to prevent 
them from doing so. Western governments barely 
raised the issue of the continuous violations of the 
arms embargo. Their economic interests in both 
countries – especially regarding arms deals – and 
cooperation on conflicts in Iraq and Syria carried 
greater weight in the calculations of Western gov-
ernments than the need to persuade regional powers 
to play a more constructive role in Libya. 
In contrast to the regional powers, Western states 
had not contributed to the escalation of the conflicts 
in 2014. Indeed, they had united in support for a 
negotiated solution. However, the more protracted 
the situation in Libya, and the more remote any 
restoration of state authority, the more Western gov-
ernments became directly involved. This initially 
occurred in pursuit of counterterrorism. From early 
2016, French special forces supported Haftar’s forces 
in Benghazi.17 While French diplomats consistently 
played down this presence as merely for reconnais-
sance, the political signal was unmistakeable: despite 
his aggressive opposition to the Skhirat agreement, 
Haftar enjoyed Paris’s support. This made the official 
French support for the agreement meaningless, and 
shattered European unity on Libya. 
In May 2016, the US, UK and Italy began to support 
Misratan forces – the biggest military counterweight 
to Haftar – in their offensive against the IS strong-
 
17 Cyril Bensimon, Frédéric Bobin and Madjid Zerrouky, 
“Trois membres de la DGSE tués en Libye, le gouvernement 
libyen proteste”, Le Monde, 20 July 2016. 
hold of Sirte, including with special forces.18 From 
August onwards, US fighter jets flew hundreds of 
sorties on Sirte. Officially, US airstrikes came on the 
request of the newly-formed GNA, and in support 
of forces loyal to it. In reality, politicians and armed 
groups in Misrata were divided in their attitude to-
wards the GNA. The government had no influence 
over the course of the offensive, and the lack of GNA 
support alienated even militias that had backed the 
agreement.19 In turn, opponents of the GNA saw assis-
tance for Misratan militias as proof that Western 
states used the cover of the GNA to extend support to 
their political adversaries.20 
The victory of local forces over the IS affiliate in 
the eastern city of Darna in April 2016, the IS defeat 
in Sirte in December, and Haftar’s steady advances in 
Benghazi annihilated “Islamic State” as a territorial 
force in Libya – almost entirely without the GNA’s 
help. The threat of an IS emirate on the southern 
Mediterranean coast receded, and Libya slid down the 
priority lists of the US, UK and France. At the same 
time, the increasing migration flows through Libya 
were a priority for Germany and Italy. Following the 
EU’s refugee agreement with Turkey in March 2016, 
the central Mediterranean route became the biggest 
challenge in attempts to seal off the EU’s external 
borders. The number of migrants arriving in the EU 
via Libya rose to a record high in 2016.21 
Since early 2017, Europeans have come to terms 
with the fact the GNA as such lacks the capacity to 
curb migrant flows. As a result, networks of vested 
interests have formed between EU governments and 
local conflict actors. The Italian government quietly 
made arrangements with local militias that controlled 
the migration business in western Libyan port cities.22 
Among the coastguard units that benefit from Euro-
 
18 Missy Ryan and Sudarsan Raghavan, “U.S. Special 
Operations Troops Aiding Libyan Forces in Major Battle 
against Islamic State”, Washington Post, 9 August 2016. 
19 Author’s interviews with officers and leaders of armed 
groups involved in the offensive, Misrata, September 2016. 
20 Author’s interviews with political representatives, Bani 
Walid, September 2016. 
21 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), Italy Sea Arrivals Dashboard, January – December 
2017 (Geneva, 11 January 2018, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/ 
documents/download/61547 (accessed 8 March 2018). 
22 Daniel Howden, “The Central Mediterranean: European 
Priorities, Libyan Realities”, Refugees Deeply, October 2017, 
http://issues.newsdeeply.com/central-mediterranean-
european-priorities-libyan-realities (accessed 8 March 2018). 
 Libya: The Gamble That Failed 
 SWP Berlin 
 Mission Impossible? 
 UN Mediation in Libya, Syria and Yemen 
 October 2018 
 21 
pean support are local groups that are directly in-
volved in these criminal activities.23 The cooperation 
of the Serraj government with European efforts to 
seal off Libya’s shores has undermined the GNA do-
mestically, provoking accusations that it was Europe’s 
puppet. The now overwhelming focus of EU Libya 
policy on containing migration has not only sup-
planted the original goal of contributing to the re-
establishment of a functioning government – it 
is diametrically opposed to it. 
Competing Forums 
The growing entanglement of external actors in 
Libya’s conflicts also led to a proliferation of media-
tion forums. The fact that the UMSMIL-led process 
had reached a dead end by mid-2016 paved the way 
for unilateral initiatives, which in turn was detri-
mental to the UN’s role. Egypt took the lead, organ-
ising several rounds of talks from December 2016 
onwards with Libyan politicians who were seen 
as acceptable by Cairo. Egypt subsequently began 
mediating between Haftar’s representatives and 
military officers from western and southern Libya. 
These Egyptian efforts conflicted with those of 
UNSMIL in that Cairo sought to negotiate an arrange-
ment in which its Libyan clients would play leading 
roles, and Islamists were to be excluded. At the same 
time, Egypt resisted Algerian and Tunisian attempts 
to build a joint initiative, which would have required 
a more balanced approach. 
Russia remained largely passive during the Skhirat 
negotiations, but it did not try to undermine the 
talks. Once the agreement was concluded, it weighed 
in as an advocate for the deal’s opponents. Haftar 
made several high-profile visits to Moscow. Subse-
quently, however, Russian diplomats sought to diver-
sify their contacts in Libya and dispel suspicions of 
Russian support for Haftar, trying to position Russia 
as a mediator.24 
 
23 Amnesty International, Libya’s Dark Web of Collusion, 
December 2017, https://www.amnesty.org/download/ 
Documents/MDE1975612017ENGLISH.PDF (accessed 8 March 
2018); Mark Micallef and Tuesday Reitano, The Anti-Human 
Smuggling Business and Libya’s Political End Game, North Africa 
Report 2 (Institute for Security Studies/The Global Initiative 
against Transnational Organized Crime, December 2017), 
https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/nar2.pdf 
(accessed 22 May 2018). 
24 Yuri Barmin, Russia in Libya: From Authoritarian Stability 
to Consensus Settlement, Alsharq Forum Expert Brief (August 
In July 2017, French President Emmanuel Macron 
received Haftar and Serraj near Paris, and subsequently 
gave the misleading impression that they had reached 
an agreement. Macron’s initiative was extraordinary 
both for the French leadership’s nonchalance in uni-
laterally trying to reshape international mediation 
efforts, and for its willingness to make Haftar a legiti-
mate interlocutor for European heads of state without 
extracting any concessions from him.25 Several visits 
by Haftar to Rome followed. However, the fact that 
European governments now courted Haftar did not 
increase his readiness to compromise. Finally, the 
African Union proposed yet another mediation initia-
tive outside the UN framework with a summit for 
Libyan actors in September 2017. Haftar apparently 
did not consider that meeting sufficiently important 
to merit his attendance. 
The UN Special Representative Ghassan Salamé, 
in office since July 2017, initially managed to breathe 
new life into the UN efforts and contain the drift 
towards unilateral mediation initiatives. However, 
Salamé still had to contend with the French-led push 
for quick elections. When Salamé was unable to 
demonstrate much progress by the spring of 2018, 
individual states re-appeared with their unilateral 
initiatives – including, once again, France. In May 
2018, the Elysée surprised other Western govern-
ments and UNSMIL with a single-handed attempt to 
coax a handful of Libyan actors into accepting tight 
deadlines for parliamentary and presidential elec-
tions.26 While several Western governments were 
sceptical, the Italians, in particular, openly opposed 
the French initiative.27 Salamé was left to juggle 
Macron’s insistence on the deadlines he introduced 
with other governments’ demands for progress on 
the conditions necessary to hold elections. While the 
French initiative was entirely unrealistic – both for 
its improbable deadlines, and because it extracted no 
firm commitments from Libyan actors – it neverthe-
less severely limited Salamé’s room for manoeuvre, 
 
2017), http://www.sharqforum.org/wp-content/uploads/dlm_ 
uploads/2017/08/Russia-in-Lybia-01.pdf (accessed 8 March 
2018). 
25 Marc Semo, “Emmanuel Macron parraine un accord en 
Libye, sans garantie de résultat”, Le Monde, 25 July 2017. 
26 Author’s interviews with Western diplomats, May 2018; 
Frédéric Bobin and Marc Semo, “A Paris, les Libyens s’accor-
dent sur des élections en décembre”, Le Monde, 30 May 2018. 
27 “Italy’s PM Conte Sees No Rush for Libyan Election”, 
Reuters, 8 August 2018. 
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depriving him of the time horizon he needed to 
develop a more sustainable negotiating framework. 
Flaws in UNSMIL’s Process Design and 
Implementation 
UNSMIL’s mediation efforts were able to build on 
fortuitous international circumstances, but also had 
to adjust to conditions it could not influence. The 
fortunate circumstances include clear Security Coun-
cil backing and unqualified Western support for UN 
mediation, as well as – until the agreement was con-
cluded – no attempts by Russia or China to under-
mine these mediation efforts. Up to the moment the 
deal was signed, no state disputed the UN’s lead role 
as mediator in the Libyan conflict. At the same time, 
differences between Security Council members meant 
that UNSMIL was unable to mobilize international 
support for a more muscular approach. Sanctions 
against so-called spoilers who sabotaged the agree-
ment, the enforcement of the arms embargo, or the 
deployment of peacekeepers were out of the ques-
tion.28 
There were no easy answers to the 
question of who the real conflict 
actors were and who should 
represent them in negotiations. 
Among the conditions that the UN Special Repre-
sentative could not readily alter were the Egyptian 
and Emirati positions. Western governments were 
not committed enough to persuade both countries to 
adopt a more cooperative stance on Libya. This posed 
a massive obstacle to any attempts at mediation. 
Of particular interest here, however, is how the 
UN dealt with these circumstances. The adverse con-
ditions outlined above notwithstanding, which deci-
sions contributed to the failure of efforts to find a 
sustainable solution? 
 
28 “Briefing and Consultations on Developments in 
the Political Dialogue in Libya”, What’s in Blue, 25 August 
2015, http://www.whatsinblue.org/2015/08/briefing-and-
consultations-on-developments-in-the-political-dialogue-in-
libya.php (accessed 8 March 2018). 
The Issue of Representativeness 
In late 2014, UNSMIL faced an extremely confusing 
political and military landscape in Libya. There were 
no easy answers to the question of who the real con-
flict actors were and who should represent them in 
negotiations. This was not only due to the problem – 
common in peace negotiations – of how to involve 
those directly responsible for military action without 
bestowing such controversial figures with legitimacy 
or losing their adversaries as negotiating parties. An 
additional complication in Libya was that the armed 
groups were often only loosely associated with formal 
political figures such as parliamentarians, but at the 
same time they rarely had leaders empowered to 
negotiate. In most cases, these groups were organised 
on the basis of individual cities, and claimed to de-
fend the interests of these cities – yet in few local-
ities did political and military actors agree on repre-
sentatives for negotiations.29 
UNSMIL built its framework on the two rump par-
liaments as negotiating parties, which corresponded 
to the fact that the dispute over legitimacy was cen-
tral to the conflict. It also allowed UNSMIL to circum-
vent the difficulties it would have faced if it had 
chosen the representatives of the conflicting parties 
itself – accusations of arbitrariness and prejudice 
would inevitably have ensued. However, this ap-
proach also raised the question of how to involve a 
broader spectrum of actors and ensure that the actual 
forces on the ground were represented. 
UNSMIL’s solution was twofold. First, it invited sev-
eral figures to the political negotiations who were as-
sociated with neither parliament. Second, it launched 
several other dialogue tracks in parallel to the politi-
cal negotiations, including meetings of representa-
tives of municipal councils, civil society activists and 
political parties, leaders of armed groups, prominent 
women and women’s right activists, as well as tribal 
representatives. It thereby hoped to garner broader 
support for the negotiation process without allowing 
these actors any actual influence over the outcome. 
The implementation of this approach had consid-
erable shortcomings. UNSMIL chose the independent 
figures it invited to the negotiations for their ability 
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to build bridges between the conflicting parties and 
propose consensual solutions.30 However, they often 
had no power base of their own and distinguished 
themselves primarily by their good relations with 
Western diplomats. The same applied to several of 
the participants UNSMIL chose – just as arbitrarily – 
for the political parties and civil society track. The 
meetings of tribal representatives were discontinued 
after two unsuccessful attempts in Egypt. Fatal for 
the negotiations’ success, however, was the fact that 
UNSMIL in mid-2015 abandoned its efforts to mediate 
between armed actors, after several fruitless attempts. 
From then on, this key constituency was only in-
directly involved in the process, and the guessing 
game began as to how the armed groups would react 
to the agreement. 
The Mediators: Facing Time Pressure and 
Conflicts of Interest 
The time pressure Special Representatives León and 
Kobler applied while attempting to conclude the nego-
tiations was seriously detrimental to the viability of 
the agreement. The rush was due to both León’s per-
sonal ambitions and pressure from Western govern-
ments for a rapid conclusion in the autumn of 2015. 
In mid-2015, León informed Western diplomats 
that he intended to leave his post within months and 
was determined to reach a deal before he handed 
over.31 In September and October, León tried to force 
an agreement to be able to take up his next post – 
director of the Emirates Diplomatic Academy – as 
soon as possible and with a success under his belt. 
This meant that León secretly negotiated his condi-
tions with high-ranking Emiratis while at the same 
time mediating in Libya, where the UAE was blatantly 
intervening on one side of the conflict.32 When this 
came to light, León had to bring forward the planned 
handover to Kobler without having obtained a result 
in Libya. 
Upon taking office, Kobler faced the choice of re-
opening the draft agreement, which had been called 
into doubt by the León scandal, or bringing it to a 
 
30 Author’s interview with UNSMIL official, Tripoli, April 
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31 Author’s interviews with Western diplomats, Berlin and 
London, September 2015. 
32 Randeep Ramesh, “UN Libya Envoy Accepts £1,000-a-
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4 November 2015. 
quick conclusion. Libyan proponents of the agree-
ment advocated the latter, not least due to self-inter-
est. However, pressure from Western governments 
for an imminent conclusion proved decisive. The 
main reason was the steady expansion of IS, espe-
cially in the region around Sirte. The Obama adminis-
tration and Italy, in particular, saw an urgent need to 
act, but wanted a “legitimate” Libyan government to 
request international support for action against IS. If 
the negotiations dragged on, however, military inter-
vention against IS would happen without a unity gov-
ernment – which, in turn, would negatively affect 
the talks. European governments also needed a legiti-
mate counterpart so as to take military action against 
human smugglers in Libyan waters, since Russia was 
blocking the mandate for this in the Security Coun-
cil.33 In late November 2015, Italy and USA set the 
pace by calling for a ministerial-level conference for 
mid-December to express its support for the agree-
ment – when no agreement yet existed.34 
The time pressure induced UNSMIL to try a risky 
manoeuvre. The negotiating parties, the HoR and 
GNC, were internally divided. According to the text of 
the agreement, the two parliaments were the parties 
to the deal, the institutional pillars of the agreement, 
and key to its implementation. However, neither par-
liament had a formal majority in favour of the agree-
ment; the presidents of both parliaments had even 
withdrawn their delegations’ mandates. UNSMIL there-
fore decided to let the negotiators sign the agreement 
in a personal capacity. To emphasise the supposedly 
broad support in Libya – as Kobler and Western 
diplomats asserted – UNSMIL flew dozens of parlia-
mentarians, mayors and other political actors to 
Skhirat for the signing ceremony. Of the 21 figures 
who initialled the agreement on 17 December 2015, 
only 11 were elected members of one or the other par-
liament; the other ten were handpicked by UNSMIL 
and mostly had no political base to speak of. 
After negotiations that within this framework had 
lasted less than a year, the time pressure exerted by 
Western governments caused defects in the agree-
ment that would prove fatal. The consent of the HoR, 
which was imperative for implementing the agree-
ment and forming a government, failed to materialise 
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after the signing, and the tug-of-war over that ques-
tion opened up rifts that permanently paralysed 
the parliament. In November, to appease as many 
clienteles as possible, Kobler increased the soon-to-be 
Presidency Council from six to nine members whilst 
maintaining the requirement for unanimous Council 
decisions. This practically ensured that the Presidency 
Council would be unable to act. Moreover, at the time 
that the negotiations were hurriedly concluded, talks 
with armed actors over security arrangements had 
not even begun. This excluded key issues from the 
agreement – issues that would remain unresolved 
thereafter. All of these problems were already appar-
ent in December 2015, but experts’ warnings against 
excessive haste went unheeded.35 That haste largely 
rested on assumptions that subsequently turned out 
to be erroneous. 
Miscalculations 
During the negotiations, the UN mediators closely 
coordinated with Western governments that intended 
to support the agreement’s implementation. They 
thus shared the miscalculations that prevailed in 
Western capitals, regarding both their own influence 
on Libyan conflict actors and the GNA’s room for 
manoeuvre. 
Even at the time of signing, Europeans were still 
planning a Libya International Assistance Mission 
(LIAM), for which Italy wanted to provide as many as 
5,000 soldiers – ostensibly to train Libyan forces, but 
in reality to protect the GNA and the international 
presence in Tripoli.36 These plans were key to West-
ern designs for the agreement’s implementation – 
but they were divorced from Libyan realities. It was 
clear that no Libyan government would agree to such 
a foreign presence. When the Italian government 
finally realised this, the plans were shelved. 
In addition, both the UN Special Representative 
and Western governments overestimated the effect 
of the punitive measures at their disposal. León and 
Kobler repeatedly threatened sanctions against 
 
35 See e.g. ICG, “Statement on a Political Deal for Libya”, 
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(accessed 8 March 2018). 
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London and Berlin, November and December 2015. See 
also Francesco Grignetti, “Ora è possibile l’opzione militare. 
All’Italia il coordinamento del Liam”, La Stampa, 31 March 
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spoilers, but differences within the Security Council 
prevented UN sanctions against leading GNA oppo-
nents, including Haftar. The EU and US therefore 
imposed separate sanctions against three politicians, 
including the presidents of the two parliaments.37 All 
three were figureheads rather than heavyweights, and 
it is debatable whether the term “spoilers” really ap-
plied to them. After all, there were justified objec-
tions to the legitimacy of the accord and the govern-
ment formed by it. Their opposition to an agreement 
that would lead to the dominance of their political 
rivals was also understandable. Besides, the sanctions 
had no significant impact, except for reinforcing the 
defiance of those opposing the agreement. 
Western diplomats also based their calculations 
on the expectation that the Presidency Council and its 
government would overcome their initial legitimacy 
deficit by creating new facts on the ground. Since 
the GNA alone would have access to state funds, they 
argued, it would gradually buy off fence-sitters and 
opponents of the agreement. In March 2016, Western 
governments and the UN urged the Presidency Coun-
cil to take office in Tripoli despite the fact that the 
parliament in Tobruk had approved neither the agree-
ment nor the government.38 Since there was no pro-
gress on negotiating security arrangements, the Presi-
dency Council depended for its security in Tripoli on 
local militias whom several GNA members viewed as 
enemy forces. 
The move to Tripoli contributed to reinforcing the 
initial divergences between the parties to the agree-
ment.39 Several members of the Presidency Council 
and government refused to work in Tripoli under 
these conditions, which essentially meant that the 
Presidency Council had already lost its claim to spear-
head a government of national unity. Nor was it able 
to create the expected facts on the ground. The gover-
nor of the Central Bank did not allow the Presidency 
Council access to regular budgets, as long as the par-
liament had neither approved the government nor a 
budget, let alone monitored state expenditure. Finally, 
members of the Presidency Council worked against 
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rather than with each other, meaning that the cli-
entelist networks of individual members did not 
amount to a power structure for the government as 
a whole. Consequently, the Presidency Council had 
no control over the various forces that were loosely 
associated with it. 
The UN: From Mediator to 
Party in the Conflict 
With the conclusion of the agreement in December 
2015, the Security Council tasked UNSMIL with sup-
porting the implementation of the agreement and 
coordinating capacity-building measures for the GNA. 
If the agreement had in fact been a power-sharing 
arrangement between the conflicting parties, this task 
would have been compatible with the role of impar-
tial mediator. However, since the agreement was con-
cluded between certain actors against the resistance 
of many others, the UN role was now to support the 
Presidency Council in asserting itself against its adver-
saries. In Tripoli, this amounted to a tacitly acquies-
cent attitude toward the militias allied with the Presi-
dency Council, who drove their rivals out of the 
capital in several rounds of fighting starting in mid-
2016. The actors in Tripoli themselves even viewed 
this evolution as driven by UNSMIL’s senior security 
advisor, the Italian General Paolo Serra – an impres-
sion the UN mission did nothing to dispel – and the 
Italian government.40 In eastern Libya, this meant 
that UNSMIL backed a group of controversial militia 
leaders, simply because they viewed the GNA as an 
opportunity to expand their influence at Haftar’s 
expense.41 
Soon after the Presidency Council 
arrived in Tripoli, it became clear 
that the agreement would not see 
implementation and that the country 
remained politically divided. 
Soon after the Presidency Council arrived in Tripoli, 
it became clear that the agreement would not see 
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implementation and that the country remained po-
litically divided. As a result, Western officials empha-
sised that a modified agreement would have to make 
room for Haftar. However, UNSMIL, being so closely 
associated with the GNA, could hardly mediate 
between the government and its opponents. In fact, 
Haftar refused to meet Kobler for more than a year 
after the agreement was reached – declaring it would 
be “a waste of time”.42 Only when Ghassan Salamé 
assumed office in July 2017 did UNSMIL begin to dis-
tance itself from the GNA and once again seek a role 
as impartial mediator. 
Conclusions and Outlook 
UN Special Representatives León and Kobler in 2015 
tried to negotiate a transitional power-sharing arrange-
ment to overcome Libya’s political divisions under 
challenging conditions. The UN mediators enjoyed 
the unanimous support of the Security Council and 
Western states, but they had limited influence on 
local actors because deploying peacekeepers to en-
force the agreement was never a realistic option, 
and the great powers were unable or unwilling to dis-
suade regional states from supporting the conflict 
parties. 
Given these conditions, there is no definite answer 
to the question of whether a more patient approach 
by the UN mediators, and a stronger integration of 
armed actors, might have produced a more workable 
power-sharing agreement. However, poor decisions by 
the UN mediators and Western governments, particu-
larly during the final phase of the talks, meant that 
UNSMIL’s efforts at that stage no longer amounted to 
a serious attempt to reach a viable agreement. Neither 
León’s personal ambitions nor concerns about the on-
going expansion of IS justified the haste with which 
the agreement was pushed through. Already at the 
time, it was clear that the assumptions underlying 
this approach were unrealistic. The fact that UN Sec-
retary-General Ban Ki-moon approved León’s move 
from Special Representative to a highly-paid post in 
the UAE – and that the UN as well as Western gov-
ernments then simply swept the scandal under the 
carpet – also gives cause for concern that such ob-
vious conflicts of interest may feature with future 
UN mediators as well. 
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From the perspective of Western governments, 
the Skhirat agreement was a partial success despite 
its failure. Although the internationally recognised 
government in Tripoli was largely impotent, it al-
lowed them to pursue key interests. The US, UK and 
Italy assisted Misratan militias in fighting IS in Sirte 
with GNA approval, sticking to the fiction that these 
militias were forces loyal to the GNA. The EU, and 
particularly Italy, used the GNA as a cover to con-
clude arrangements with local militias to curb migra-
tion. By late 2016, IS had lost all its territory in Libya, 
and in 2017 the number of migrants arriving in the 
EU via Libya dropped by a third compared to the pre-
vious year – without a real unity government having 
been formed. Oil production also recovered – despite, 
rather than because of the Skhirat agreement. The 
urgency with which Western governments and the 
UN had forced through the formation of a unity gov-
ernment then gave way to an accommodation to the 
status quo. 
However, rapidly installing a government that 
served as a front for the pursuit of Western interests 
came with consequences. The repercussions of the 
Skhirat negotiations have created more obstacles to 
the UN’s ongoing mediation attempts. The contro-
versy over the agreement irreversibly divided both 
parliaments, which lost all credibility in the eyes of 
the Libyan public. They are now even less suited to 
acting as negotiating parties than they were during 
the Skhirat talks. For better or worse, UNSMIL will 
have to try a new approach, one that relies on actors 
who are not elected officials. Designating representa-
tives will be yet more difficult because the agreement 
has further exacerbated the fragmentation of the 
political landscape. And finally, with the failure of 
Skhirat, the last chance to negotiate a power-sharing 
agreement with a wider range of actors in eastern 
Libya than just Haftar was missed. Since the Skhirat 
agreement, Haftar has established himself so firmly 
there with his repressive tactics that other political 
forces can no longer organise in the east. His 
strengthened position also means that his ambitions 
are difficult for other Libyan political players to 
accommodate. And as long as Haftar not only con-
tinues to receive support from the UAE and Egypt, 
but is now being courted by Western governments, 
he remains in a position to veto any deal. 
UN Special Representative Salamé was initially 
adept at recommitting Libyan and international 
actors to the UN-led process. He set out to negotiate 
amendments to the Skhirat agreement by the two 
parliaments; organise a conference at which all po-
litical and social groups would be represented, but 
whose objectives remained unclear; and hold a 
referendum on the draft constitution presented in 
July 2017 by the constitutional assembly, as well 
as elections – all in 2018.43 
Lack of progress on these points has since forced 
Salamé to revise his roadmap. His attempts to per-
suade the parliaments to make a move that would 
spell their own dissolution have proven futile. 
UNSMIL turned the National Conference into a broad-
based, local-level consultation process that offers no 
basis for new negotiations. Under pressure from the 
French push for rapid elections, Salamé has at times 
stated that voting could take place without prior 
amendment of the Skhirat agreement or a referen-
dum on the constitution; at times he has dismissed 
the feasibility of elections in the near term, but has 
expressed confidence that a constitutional referen-
dum could be held.44 And while Salamé has publicly 
recognised that negotiations between the two parlia-
ments offer little prospect for progress, he has not 
proposed an alternative framework for negotiations. 
As a result, by mid-2018, there was no longer a clearly 
identifiable political process. In this vacuum, parallel 
initiatives began reappearing, among them Macron’s 
unsuccessful attempt to push through an agreement 
on elections at a Paris meeting in May 2018; an Italian 
plan for a Libya conference with unclear objectives, 
to take place in November 2018; and a “reconciliation 
meeting” between Libyan players the African Union 
scheduled for late 2018.45 
A key obstacle to rapid elections is the absence of a 
legal and constitutional basis for a vote. In September 
2018, the HoR claimed to have passed the necessary 
amendment to the 2011 constitutional declaration to 
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pave the way for a referendum on the draft constitu-
tion. But such a referendum would be a risky propo-
sition, since it could lead into a dead end if the draft 
is rejected or if the referendum is not held in all parts 
of the country. Both possibilities have been made 
more likely by the disputed manner in which the HoR 
drafted and adopted the referendum law.46 Moreover, 
the draft constitution itself is controversial: the Ama-
zigh ethnic minority boycotted the constitutional pro-
cess, and representatives of other important groups 
in the constitutional assembly refuse to recognise the 
draft. In addition, political and military power rela-
tions in the country have fundamentally changed 
since the elections to the constitutional assembly in 
2014. The balance of power is still so far from being 
settled that it is probably not realistic to adopt a per-
manent constitution for the country at the moment. 
For Libyans to decide how to deal with the draft, a 
greater degree of stability is necessary. In the mean-
time, however, the constitutional or political basis for 
elections is lacking, and the two parliaments have lost 
both the ability and the credibility needed to produce 
such a basis. Salamé has repeatedly spoken out 
against a new transitional arrangement, but that is 
exactly what is needed before elections can be held. 
The most important lesson from the mistakes of 
Skhirat is that imposing seemingly quick solutions to 
the power struggles in Libya comes at the expense of 
their viability, and is ultimately counterproductive. 
Western governments and UNSMIL should avoid 
making the same mistake again. At the time of writ-
ing, the objective of holding elections as soon as pos-
sible continues to dominate international policies 
towards Libya, despite the lack of any progress on 
creating the conditions for successful elections. 
UNSMIL and most European governments see elec-
tions as a solution to the demise of legitimate insti-
tutions in Libya. But without a sufficiently broad 
agreement on the legal and constitutional framework 
for elections, voting is likely to deepen Libya’s crisis 
of legitimacy, not resolve it.47 Moreover, it is worth 
remembering that the idea of elections first gained 
traction among international players as a way of 
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integrating Haftar into the political process, on the 
assumption that he saw elections as being in his 
interest. However, not only has Haftar made contra-
dictory statements regarding his support for elections, 
but he may very well be interested in elections only 
in areas under his control, or he may expect to ben-
efit from a failed attempt to hold elections. 
For elections to resolve the conflicts in Libya rather 
than to fuel them, a range of conditions have to be 
met that cannot be created by international decrees. 
Only a constitution – or, indeed, an agreement that 
prevails in lieu of a constitution – can determine 
what institution elections will be held for, and what 
the competencies of that institution should be. Voters 
and candidates require assurances that warlords and 
militia leaders will not dictate election results in their 
respective areas of control; that elections will take 
place across the country; and that the majority of 
actors will accept the outcome. To move towards 
these conditions, a new, more effective power-sharing 
agreement is needed that also includes security ar-
rangements. Reaching such an accord requires persis-
tent mediation efforts and consistent international 
support. Given that the dysfunctional institutions 
created by the Skhirat agreement have long blocked 
progress towards such an agreement, and that there 
now no longer is a political process, it may be time to 
build a new negotiating framework – one that brings 
together actors with real influence on the ground.48 
To build such a framework, the UN will need Euro-
pean support for a more sustainable approach, not 
unilateral initiatives for quick fixes. 
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A power-sharing arrangement between regime and 
opposition representatives, and a political transition 
to an inclusive, democratic and pluralistic political 
system ought to have pacified the Syrian civil war. 
At least, that is what both the 2012 Geneva Commu-
niqué and Security Council Resolution 2254 of 
December 2015 stipulate. Yet, neither UN mediator 
Staffan de Mistura (in office since July 2014) nor his 
two predecessors Kofi Annan (February–August 
2012) and Lakhdar Brahimi (August 2012–May 2014), 
who were joint UN and League of Arab States media-
tors, managed to bring the Syrian conflict parties to 
the table for negotiations on substance. They were 
thus unable to make progress on power-sharing or a 
political transition; neither could they contribute to 
sustainably calming the conflict, or effectively protect 
the civilian population. 
Instead, the conflicts of interest were initially 
fought out militarily between local actors, and then 
also between regional and international actors. Rus-
sia, which has been directly involved in the fighting 
on the side of the regime and its allies since Septem-
ber 2015, has tried to use its military successes to 
resolve the conflict. In 2017 Moscow, together with 
Ankara and Tehran, established an alternative nego-
tiation and conflict-management format in Astana, 
Kazakhstan, which competed with the UN approach. 
Yet, the Astana powers were equally unable to initiate 
direct negotiations, sustainably pacify the fighting, 
or make progress towards a political solution. Rather, 
the conflict escalated again on several fronts starting 
in the first half of 2018, after so-called “Islamic state” 
had largely lost its territorial base and rebels had 
been pushed back into a few enclaves. The leadership 
in Damascus under Bashar al-Assad was set to recap-
ture additional territories; the regional powers (espe-
cially Iran, Turkey and Israel) sought to militarily 
realise their interests in the future order of Syria; and 
Russia and the USA also continued to play the mili-
tary card. 
This contribution analyses the UN’s approach to 
mediation in the Syria conflict against the backdrop 
of the conflict dynamics, the incompatible interests of 
the conflict parties, regional powers and international 
actors. It focuses on the following issues: how does 
Staffan de Mistura’s mediation mission deal with 
local, regional and international conflict actors? What 
are the main obstacles to the UN approach in Syria? 
What other factors in the mission’s approach make 
success more difficult? What can European policy-
makers do to support UN mediation and make it 
more effective? 
Conflict Dynamics and Conflict Actors 
The war in Syria began with civil protests against 
police violence, family rule and kleptocracy.1 From 
the outset of protests – usually dated 15 March 
2011 – the regime resorted to a limited number of 
reforms, but above all to violence in order to quell 
the initially peaceful and unarmed demonstrations. 
In response, activists and deserters armed them-
selves – first to defend demonstrations and opposi-
tion strongholds, later to fight the regime actively. By 
the summer of 2011, the demonstrations were already 
turning into an armed uprising. 
Countries in the region, first and foremost Turkey 
and the Arab Gulf states, quickly began to support 
various rebel groups logistically, financially or with 
training and arms, as did some European countries 
and the USA. This not only fostered the illusion that 
the opposition could prevail militarily, but also con-
tributed to rivalries and continued power struggles 
 
1 On the causes and development of the conflict in the 
first years, see Muriel Asseburg, “Die syrische Tragödie – 
vom zivilen Protest zum Bürgerkrieg”, in Orient im Umbruch: 
Der Arabische Frühling und seine Folgen, ed. Klaus Gallas (Halle 
[Saale], 2014), 96–107. 
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within the ranks of the opposition. The armed oppo-
sition nevertheless conquered neighbourhoods of 
provincial towns, villages and rural areas in many 
parts of Syria. The regime shifted to besieging, starv-
ing and bombarding towns and districts captured 
by the rebels. It also withdrew its troops from the 
majority-Kurdish areas in the north and northeast of 
the country to concentrate on securing the capital, 
strategic locations and central transport routes. 
The Russian military intervention in 
September 2015 turned the tide 
in favour of the Syrian regime. 
When in 2012 the survival of the regime seemed 
seriously threatened, Iran and the Lebanese Hezbol-
lah first came to its aid. Yet it was only the Russian 
military intervention in September 2015 that turned 
the tide in the civil war in favour of the regime, 
enabling it to gradually reconquer lost territory with 
the support of the Russian Air Force. In 2017, IS in 
Syria also came under huge pressure.2 Having con-
quered large swathes of territory in Syria and Iraq 
since 2013, IS had proclaimed a caliphate in 2014 and 
founded a proto-state. Its representatives asserted the 
claim that this caliphate was to have a global reach, 
and encouraged the establishment of local offshoots 
in other fragile states. After successes against IS in 
Iraq, the US-led anti-IS coalition, established in 2014, 
shifted its efforts to Syria in 2017. In conjunction 
with the parallel efforts of Russia, Iran and the Assad 
regime, the coalition managed to push IS back and 
almost completely deprive it of its territorial base. 
In particular, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), 
dominated by Kurds, recaptured areas in the north 
and east of the country with US air support and the 
help of Special Forces. They extended their control 
far beyond the majority-Kurdish areas. In August 
2018, the regime and its allies controlled around 
61 percent, the SDF around 25 percent, various rebel 
groups around 8 percent, Turkey with its rebel allies 
some 2 percent and IS some 4 percent of Syrian 
territory.3 
 
2 James Dobbins and Seth G. Jones, “The End of a Cali-
phate”, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 59, no. 3 (Mai 2017): 
55–72. 
3 See map on page 31. 
The Local Level: The Assad Regime, 
Rebels and the PYD 
From the very beginning, the Assad regime catego-
rised all opponents and insurgents as terrorists. 
Damascus did carry out limited reforms to meet the 
demands of individual population groups. Yet, at no 
point was the Syrian leadership prepared to engage 
in substantial negotiations with representatives of the 
opposition on power-sharing and political transition. 
Since summer 2017 at the latest, and due to its suc-
cessful reconquest of territory, the Syrian leadership 
has considered itself victorious. It declared the civil 
war over and heralded a phase of reconstruction.4 
It also made clear its intention to continue the fight 
against terrorism – in other words, to reconquer 
those areas that were still under rebel, SDF or IS con-
trol. At the same time, it felt less and less pressure to 
engage in negotiations on a nationwide ceasefire or 
humanitarian access to besieged areas. Although 
the regime temporarily allowed territories to remain 
under Kurdish or rebel control so as to pool its forces 
elsewhere, it had (and has) no intention of accepting a 
permanent territorial division of power. Accordingly, 
it continued to besiege and bomb even the de-escala-
tion zones negotiated by the Astana powers. In the 
first half of 2018, it reconquered those in the eastern 
suburbs of Damascus (East Ghouta) and those north of 
Homs; in July it recaptured the one in the southwest; 
in September it prepared an offensive to retake the 
one in the northwest. The offensive was only averted 
last minute in mid-September by a Turkish-Russian 
understanding on establishing a demilitarised zone 
along the de-escalation zone’s boundaries.5 
From the outset, the Syrian opposition not only 
fought against the Assad regime, but also struggled 
to establish inclusive and effective representation 
with a joint programme. The obstacles were substan-
tial: opposition members represented a wide range 
of ideological trends, were divided into forces in the 
 
4 Muriel Asseburg and Khaled Yacoub Oweis, Syria’s Recon-
struction Scramble. In a Game Fraught with Political Risk, Europe 
Should Aim for Long-term Stabilization, SWP Comments 51/2017 
(Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, December 2017), 
https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/ 
comments/2017C51_ass_ows.pdf (accessed 27 February 2018). 
5 “Memorandum on Stabilisation of the Situation in the 
Idlib De-Escalation Area, Sochi, 17 September 2018”, in The 
National, 19 September 2018, https://www.thenational.ae/ 
world/mena/full-text-of-turkey-russia-memorandum-on-idlib-
revealed-1.771953 (accessed 20 September 2018). 
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country and in exile, and there were serious diver-
gences of interest between civilian actors and armed 
groups. Various opposition alliances came together 
in several phases, most recently in November 2017 
under the umbrella of the Syrian Negotiating Com-
mittee (SNC) in Riyadh. As the regime’s attitude 
hardened, the opposition’s stance became more prag-
matic in the face of military losses. At the same time, 
the opposition members represented in the Syrian 
Interim Government (SIG) – established in exile in 
Turkey in March 2013 – and the SNC lost influence 
over the conflict on the ground. Instead, radical forces 
excluded from or unwilling to participate in nego-
tiations gained in importance.6 For example, in the 
largest rebel-controlled enclave in the northwest of 
the country, Idlib Province, the jihadist al-Nusra Front 
(now the Levant Liberation Committee, HTS) prevailed 
over more moderate competing groups and established 
its own local government, the so-called National Sal-
vation Government, in November 2017. It took con-
trol of the border crossings and soon dominated the 
local councils in many places, either directly or by 
infiltration.7 
For quite a while, it looked as if the Kurds would 
be the main beneficiaries of military developments. 
As early as 2012, the regime had withdrawn its troops 
from the predominantly Kurdish populated areas in 
the north and northeast of the country without any 
significant fighting. This allowed the Kurds to an-
nounce a self-administered area there (in their own 
words: Rojava, i.e. Western Kurdistan) in 2012, in 
which the Syrian PKK offshoot, the Democratic Union 
Party (PYD), seized power with its fighters. In March 
2016, the PYD not only announced extensive autono-
my in the predominantly Kurdish areas, but also 
established a political structure in line with the ideol-
ogy of Abdullah Öcalan.8 However, the PYD’s govern-
 
6 For an overview of the main armed groups and their 
strength, see The International Institute for Strategic Studies 
(IISS), The Military Balance 118, no. 1 (2018): 364f. 
7 However, the situation remained fluid. At the beginning 
of 2018, more moderate rebel groups joined forces against 
the HTS and pushed the Jihadists out of parts of the prov-
ince. 
8 The social contract emphasises direct democracy, gender 
equality and religious freedom, including the integration of 
non-Kurdish minorities. YPG International, Charter of the So-
cial Contract, 1 July 2016, https://ypginternational.blackblogs. 
org/2016/07/01/charter-of-the-social-contract-in-rojava/ 
(accessed 21 February 2018). 
ance was by no means as progressive and democratic 
as it had set out to be.9 
The PYD was barely able to translate 
its military successes into political 
achievements. 
PYD fighters also successfully offered their services 
as ground troops to the international anti-IS coalition 
for the fight against Jihadists. In return, they received 
military equipment and training from the USA within 
the SDF. With American air support, the SDF suc-
ceeded in liberating a large part of the areas controlled 
by IS in Syria – well beyond the Kurdish-majority 
areas. However, the PYD was barely able to translate 
its military success into political achievements. It was 
not represented either in the UN-led negotiations or 
in the Astana format, since Turkey was vehemently 
opposed to its participation. The PYD’s territorial 
gains also remained precarious: they did not amount 
to a contiguous self-governing area. In the autumn of 
2016, Turkey intervened militarily to drive a wedge 
between the Kurdish cantons and create a buffer 
zone. After the US announced its continued coopera-
tion with the SDF,10 Ankara intervened again in Janu-
ary 2018 to expel the PYD from the Afrin canton 
and turn the Kurdish cantons into enclaves. Simulta-
neously, PYD fighters in the east of the country came 
under pressure from regime troops seeking to bring 
areas liberated from IS under their control. 
 
 
9 Dissident Kurds have been muzzled, independent activ-
ities largely stopped. See Rana Khalaf, Governing Rojava: Layers 
of Legitimacy in Syria (London: Chatham House, 2016); Wladimir 
van Wilgenburg, “This Is a New Syria, Not a New Kurdistan”, 
Middle East Eye, 17 March 2017, http://www.middleeasteye. 
net/news/analysis-kurds-syria-rojava-1925945786 (accessed 
21 February 2018). 
10 In mid-January 2018 a US military spokesman announced 
the establishment of an SDF border force. The then-US Sec-
retary of State Rex Tillerson denied such a plan after 
outraged Turkish reactions. See “U.S. Backpedals on Kurdish 
Force as Turkey Prepares for War”, Washington Post, 19 Janu-
ary 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the-us-
backpedals-on-new-kurdish-force-as-turkey-prepares-for-
war/2018/01/18/7f6e1628-547b-40a5-8a45-9a4c133719b6_ 
story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.5c3bd8b65427 
(accessed 15 May 2018). 
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The Regional Level: Turkey, the Arab Gulf 
States, Iran and Israel 
From the outset, the regional powers in the Middle 
East shared few common priorities motivating them 
to engage in constructive joint conflict management 
in Syria. It is true that, like the international actors, 
they have regularly emphasised the need for a politi-
cal settlement to the conflict that would preserve 
Syria’s territorial integrity and state institutions and 
serve the interests of Syrians. Yet, this has not pre-
vented them from seeking to assert their own inter-
ests and instrumentalise different parties within the 
conflict or even intervene militarily themselves. 
At first, Turkey and the Arab Gulf states (above all 
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and initially also the UAE) sup-
ported various rebel groups to bring about a regime 
change in Syria. They thereby hoped to release Syria, 
a country of central geopolitical relevance, from its 
long-standing alliance with Iran and bring forces to 
power which would be favourably disposed to them. 
They did not agree, however, on which forces should 
prevail, and so each promoted groups ideologically 
close to them, instead of focusing on uniting the anti-
regime forces.11 Since the direct Russian interventions 
in 2015 (at the latest), the main supporters of the 
rebels have significantly reduced their aid. Not only 
did armed rebellion no longer seem effective in the 
face of Russian supremacy, the Arab Gulf states also 
shifted their main focus to the war in Yemen, which 
they viewed as a threatening proxy conflict with Iran 
in their immediate neighbourhood. 
In Turkey, on the other hand, civil war with the 
PKK, which had flared up again in 2015, and the run-
up to the parliamentary elections brought forward 
to June 2018, focused attention on domestic policy 
objectives. As a result, the government increasingly 
concentrated on preventing the PYD from being 
armed with heavy weapons, enhancing its inter-
national political standing and creating a contiguous 
Kurdish self-governing area on its southern border. It 
was concerned that the latter might serve as a model 
for Turkish Kurds and an area for PKK fighters to re-
treat to. It also wanted Syrian refugees to be returned 
to a “safe zone” inside Syria. As a consequence of 
Ankara’s changed assessment of the situation and 
policy priorities, Turkey turned to previously unlikely 
 
11 Their dealings with the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood 
illustrate this: Turkey and Qatar supported it; Saudi Arabia 
and the UAE tried to minimise its influence. 
partners (both Russia and Iran) and participated in 
the Astana format. It was thus able to militarily pur-
sue its interests in the zone of influence attributed to 
it in the north of the country with Russia’s approval. 
Cooperation with Russia also opened up new scope 
for foreign policy beyond Syria. Given Turkey’s tense 
relationship with its NATO allies and the EU, this was 
a significant factor. 
In Syria, Iran sided with the regime and condemned 
the uprising as an externally instigated plot to weaken 
the “axis of resistance” against Israel and the USA. 
Tehran feared losing a long-standing and important 
Arab ally in the Assad regime. During the fighting, 
the opportunity arose for Iran to: increase its presence 
in Syria; gain direct access to Hezbollah-controlled 
areas in Lebanon and thus to the Mediterranean; boost 
deterrence, particularly against Israel; and thereby 
immunise itself against possible attacks.12 Thus, 
Tehran not only sent military advisors and combat 
units, but also assumed a leading role in the military 
organisation and financing of domestic and foreign 
militias – in particular from Iraq and Afghanistan, 
along with Lebanese Hezbollah. This support was 
crucial for the Syrian regime in recapturing territory 
as the capability of regular army units trusted by the 
regime would not have sufficed.13 As a result, Iran 
was able to significantly expand its influence in Syria. 
Inter alia, it began establishing a land corridor that 
it controlled along with its militia allies to provide 
unfettered access to troops and arms from Iran via 
Iraq and Syria to Lebanon and the Mediterranean. 
Iran and Israel have incompatible 
visions for Syria’s future order. 
Israel, Jordan and Saudi Arabia in particular 
viewed the growing presence of Iran with great con-
cern.14 In 2017 indications that Iran and Hezbollah 
 
12 “Leader’s Top Aide Lauds Syria as Main Arm of Resist-
ance against Israel”, Fars News Agency, 29 December 2011, 
https://www.thefreelibrary.com/Leader%27s+Top+Aide+Lauds+
Syria+as+Main+Arm+of+Resistance+against...-a0275941943 
(accessed 28 February 2018). 
13 See IISS, The Military Balance (see note 6), 361–65. 
14 See in detail Muriel Asseburg, “Eastern Mediterranean 
Dynamics and the Evolving War in Syria: The Risk of Mili-
tary Spill-over and Policy Options for the EU”, in The Eastern 
Mediterranean: New Dynamics and Potential for Cooperation, ed. 
Nimrod Goren, EuroMeSCo Joint Policy Study 9 (Barcelona: 
EuroMeSCo/IEMed, March 2018), 60–82; for an Israeli per-
spective, see Ephraim Kam, “The Iranian Military Interven-
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could establish themselves permanently near the 
border and thereby open up another front against 
Israel initially prompted the Israeli government to 
intensify its diplomatic activities, particularly vis-à-
vis Russia and the USA. When Russia, the USA and 
Jordan agreed on a de-escalation zone in southwest-
ern Syria in July 2017, this coincided with Israel’s 
(and Jordan’s) interest in pacifying the situation in the 
border region. Yet, the agreement did not exclude a 
permanent presence of Iranian troops and Hezbollah 
militias near the border with Israel.15 As Israel did not 
consider its security interests to be sufficiently safe-
guarded, it adopted an active policy of containment 
in Syria16 to militarily prevent the establishment of 
Iranian bases, military installations and arms facto-
ries and the transfer of strategic weapons to Hez-
bollah. The situation has deteriorated since February 
2018: Israel shot down an Iranian drone that had 
entered Israeli airspace from Syria, and the Syrian air 
defence system downed an Israeli fighter jet that was 
in Syrian airspace. In the wake of the US withdrawal 
from the nuclear agreement with Iran, direct armed 
confrontations between Israel and Iran took place in 
Syria for the first time. Israel has since continued to 
target Iranian and Iran-led militias’ installations in 
Syria. What is more, their visions of political order 
for Syria remain incompatible and are bound to clash 
in the future. 
The International Level: Formulaic 
Compromises and Russian Dominance 
In June 2012 in Geneva, representatives of the inter-
national community agreed on a political solution to 
 
tion in Syria: A Look to the Future”, Strategic Assessment 20, 
no. 4 (January 2018): 19–30, http://www.inss.org.il/wp-
content/uploads/2018/01/adkan21-1ENG_3-21-32. pdf (ac-
cessed 4 March 2018). 
15 A follow-up agreement between the three countries in 
November 2017 did not contain a concrete timetable for 
the withdrawal of foreign fighters either. Furthermore, the 
Russian Foreign Minister emphasised that Iranian units and 
their allies maintained their presence in Syria at the invi-
tation of the Syrian government and therefore legitimately. 
“Russian FM Says Iran Can Legitimately Stay in Syria”, The 
Times of Israel, 14 November 2017, https://www.timesofisrael. 
com/russian-fm-says-iran-can-legitimately-stay-in-syria 
(accessed 20 March 2018). 
16 See Gil Murciano, Israel opposite Iran in Syria. The Perils of 
Active Containment, SWP Comments 41/2017 (Berlin: Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, October 2017). 
the conflict in Syria through political transition and 
power-sharing.17 Yet even the great powers Russia and 
the USA did not stop their diplomatic, financial and 
military support for Syria’s opponents. Thus, instead 
of promoting a political settlement, they encouraged 
both the regime and opposition in the belief that they 
could win the fight militarily.18 
Russia’s over-riding concerns were to be recognised 
as a major power and thus an indispensable actor in 
conflict resolution; to signal to the international com-
munity that – unlike the West – it was loyal to its 
allies and would not tolerate an externally forced 
regime change (as in Libya); and to secure or rather 
expand its influence in the Mediterranean. It there-
fore used its veto in the Security Council to protect 
the Syrian regime from coercive measures and investi-
gations of war crimes and provided financial support 
and military advisors. Following international uproar 
about the use of chemical weapons by the Assad 
regime, Russia was able to prevent a US and French 
military intervention in 201319 by successfully urging 
the regime to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention 
and agree to the elimination of its declared chemical 
weapons stocks. When the regime came under in-
creasing pressure despite Iranian support, Moscow 
decided on direct military intervention in September 
2015. Moscow’s air support turned the civil war 
around and enabled its ally Assad to recapture stra-
tegically important areas. 
Since then Moscow has assumed air supremacy 
over Syria (with the exception of areas east of the 
Euphrates), established itself as the dominant military 
force in the conflict and tried to pacify Syria together 
with Iran and Turkey within the Astana process. Yet, 
it has not used its weight to contain the regional pow-
ers’ ambitions, achieve a balance of interests, enforce 
principles of non-violent conflict settlement, or pro-
tect Syrian civilians. Rather, its own air force was 
 
17 See Action Group for Syria, Final Communiqué, 30 June 
2012, http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Syria/Final 
CommuniqueActionGroupforSyria.pdf (accessed 13 February 
2018), also known as the Geneva Communiqué. With the ex-
ception of Iran, which was not invited, all important backers 
of the conflict parties supported the communiqué. 
18 See Lakhdar Brahimi, “Did the UN Fail Syria?”, The Elders, 
4 April 2017, https://www.theelders.org/article/did-un-fail-
syria (accessed 8 March 2018). 
19 The United Kingdom had already withdrawn its partici-
pation following a vote in the House of Commons. 
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involved in the bombing of civilian targets,20 and 
Moscow granted Iran, Turkey and Israel extensive 
freedom to fight out their competing interests mili-
tarily: it had no intention of coming into conflict 
with one of the regional powers, and protecting the 
civilian population was not one of its priorities. 
The Syrian regime was able to 
assume that it had nothing to fear 
from the US. 
The USA positioned itself against Assad from the 
outset. The uprising was, at least initially, seen as an 
opportunity to establish a democratic system of gov-
ernment and an internationally cooperative leader-
ship in Syria. Nevertheless, its support for the rebels 
was hesitant; it was viewed from the outset as a 
means of exerting pressure on the regime for a nego-
tiated transition, rather than as a military instrument 
for regime change. The more radical the uprising 
became, the greater the reluctance to train, finance 
and equip the rebels with heavy weapons. The USA 
under President Barack Obama also appeared fickle 
towards the regime. Red lines regarding the use of 
chemical weapons were drawn but not enforced, 
and announced airstrikes were cancelled at the last 
moment. In August 2013, Barack Obama’s top mili-
tary advisor made it clear that the US would not pro-
vide decisive support for the rebels. In April 2013, 
he had already ruled out establishing a no-fly zone 
or other kinds of direct intervention.21 This led the 
regime and its supporters to assume that they had 
nothing to fear from the US (apart from sanctions); 
no pressure to negotiate was generated. 
Since 2014, the US has also focused its commit-
ment in the region on the fight against IS, initially in 
Iraq. In so doing, it has largely left the field to sup-
porters of the Syrian regime. Only under US President 
Donald Trump was the fight against IS in Syria fore-
grounded – substantial successes having been 
achieved in combating terrorism in Iraq. The USA 
 
20 See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Russia/Syria: Deadly 
Airstrikes on Trapped Civilians, 31 October 2017, https://www. 
hrw.org/news/2017/10/31/russia/syria-deadly-airstrikes-
trapped-civilians (accessed 13 February 2018). 
21 Associated Press, “US ‘Will Not Intervene in Syria as 
Rebels Don’t Support Interests’, Says Top General”, The Tele-
graph, 21 August 2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ 
worldnews/middleeast/syria/10257208/US-will-not-intervene-
in-Syria-as-rebels-dont-support-interests-says-top-general. 
html (accessed 19 February 2018). 
mainly relied on the Kurdish-dominated SDF on the 
ground and thus expanded a cooperation that had 
already been established under US President Barack 
Obama. At the same time, the Trump administration 
showed no interest in further supporting the rebel-
lion against Assad (discontinuing its respective pro-
grammes by the end of 2017) or in progress at the 
Geneva negotiating table. In the first half of 2018, 
Washington sent contradictory signals: while Presi-
dent Trump announced an imminent withdrawal of 
US troops, then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson still 
referred to a permanent presence intended to prevent 
IS from regaining its strength and mitigate Iran’s 
influence.22 Airstrikes by the USA, France and UK 
in response to the Assad regime’s suspected use of 
poison gas in Duma in April 2018 did nothing to alter 
this uncertain strategic orientation. In early Septem-
ber 2018 newly appointed US Syria envoy James J. 
Jeffrey announced that the US would not withdraw its 
troops any time soon, but rather take a “more active 
approach” aimed at the exit of all Iranian military 
and proxy forces from Syria and a defeat of IS without 
outlining how to get there. At the same time, the US 
president threatened stepped-up military action in 
case of a use of chemical weapons, the creation of 
new refugee flows or attack on innocent civilians.23 
UN Mediation in Syria 
In February 2012, faced with escalating violence in 
Syria and a Security Council hamstrung by Russian 
and Chinese vetoes, the UN General Assembly called 
on the Secretary-General to appoint a special envoy to 
support the League of Arab States (LAS) in mediating 
between regime and opposition to agree on a “Syrian-
led political transition to a democratic, pluralistic 
 
22 See Rex W. Tillerson, “Remarks on the Way Forward 
for the United States Regarding Syria” (Stanford, CA: Hoover 
Institute at Stanford University, 17 January 2018), https:// 
www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/01/277493.htm 
(accessed 13 February 2018). 
23 Karen DeYoung, “Trump Agrees to Indefinite Military 
Effort and New diplomatic Push in Syria, U.S. Officials 
Say”, Washington Post, 6 September 2018, https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-a-shift-trump-
approves-an-indefinite-military-and-diplomatic-effort-in-
syria-us-officials-say/2018/09/06/0351ab54-b20f-11e8-9a6a-
565d92a3585d_story.html?utm_term=.e1a50f923b3b 
(accessed 20 September 2018). 
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political system”.24 Since the beginning of the armed 
confrontations, the LAS had tried to prevent the spread 
of violence, but only achieved temporary local cease-
fires. It was unable to initiate farther-reaching media-
tion because the conflict parties had no interest in 
negotiations or a power-sharing arrangement, but in-
stead were set on military victory. The Syrian regime 
also viewed the League as biased. After all, it had 
suspended Syria’s membership in November 2011 
because the regime had not shown itself willing to 
implement an LAS action plan that it had initially 
approved.25 Moreover, the regional organisation was 
itself divided over Syria. Nor did other regional efforts 
see success: An “Islamic Quartet” initiated by the then-
Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi in early autumn 
2012 with representatives from Saudi Arabia, Iran 
and Turkey did not meet as planned at the foreign-
minister level. The Quartet would have included Iran, 
a supporter of the Syrian regime, but Saudi Arabia re-
jected the idea and did not participate in the meeting.26 
Joint UN/LAS Special Envoys 
On the basis of Resolution 66/253 of February 2012, 
the UN Secretary-General appointed Kofi Annan as 
the first joint mediator of the UN and LAS in the same 
month. Yet, former UN Secretary-General Annan 
resigned less than six months later because the Assad 
regime had refused to implement his peace plan, the 
opposition hoped to make military gains, and he had 
received no tangible support from the UN Security 
 
24 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), Resolution 
66/253 (New York, 16 February 2012), https://de.scribd.com/ 
document/96936260/Syria-UNGA-Resolution-66-253 (accessed 
9 March 2018). 
25 Council of the League of the Arab States, Resolution 
No. 7436 (Doha, 2 November 2011), https://view.officeapps. 
live.com/op/view.aspx?src=https%3A%2F%2Fahlambauer. 
files.wordpress.com%2F2012%2F02%2F20111102_al-
council_action-plan_developmentsofthesituationinthesyrian 
arabrepublic.docx; Council of the League of the Arab States, 
Resolution No. 7444 (Cairo, 22 January 2012), http://www.lcil. 
cam.ac.uk/sites/default/files/LCIL/documents/arabspring/syria/ 
Syria_60_AL_Council_Resolution_7444.pdf (both accessed 
9 March 2018). 
26 Michael Theodoulou, “Quartet’s Chances for Syria Peace 
May Be Bleak”, The National, 19 September 2012, https://www. 
thenational.ae/uae/quartet-s-chances-for-syria-peace-may-be-
bleak-1.402688 (accessed 9 March 2018). 
Council for his approach.27 His successor as UN/LAS 
envoy, Lakhdar Brahimi, was a former Algerian 
foreign minister and high-ranking UN diplomat; he 
resigned after not quite two years. Bashar al-Assad 
had announced that he would stand again as presi-
dential candidate in June 2014, thus making clear 
that he was not prepared to embark on a political 
transition. Against the background of a divided Secu-
rity Council, Brahimi had also not made any progress 
in negotiations and accused the parties in the con-
flict, especially the regime, of continuing to prefer 
military escalation.28 
Both mediators’ approaches were essentially two-
fold. On the one hand, they sought ceasefires to con-
tain the violence and build trust between the conflict 
parties. Annan also tried to add an impartial element 
by sending in an observer mission. In April 2012, the 
UN Security Council unanimously decided to deploy 
the UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS), to 
monitor compliance with a ceasefire agreed with 
the regime and the Syrian National Council, and the 
implementation of a six-point plan.29 However, as 
the conflict parties had no interest in building trust 
but rather sought to pursue their goals militarily, the 
approach was doomed to failure. The mission was 
forced to cease almost all its activities by mid-June 
2012: violence had escalated again; the observers’ 
freedom of movement had been increasingly re-
stricted; and their patrols had been attacked several 
times.30 The UN/LAS mediators on the other hand 
relied on negotiations with the major and regional 
 
27 UN News Centre, “Opening Remarks by Kofi Annan, 
Joint Special Envoy for Syria, at Press Conference”, Geneva, 
2 August 2012, http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/Syria/ 
press.asp?sID=41 (accessed 9 March 2018). 
28 Ian Black, “UN Syria Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi Resigns 
after Failure of Geneva Talks”, The Guardian, 13 May 2014, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/13/un-syria-
envoy-lakhdar-brahimi-resigns (accessed 9 March 2018). 
29 Security Council Resolution 2043 of 21 April 2012 pro-
vides for the deployment of up to 300 unarmed military 
observers, including a civilian contingent. In the end, 278 
military observers and 212 civilian observers were sent. On 
the basis of Security Council Resolution 2042, an advance 
team of 30 unarmed observers had already travelled to Syria. 
30 See the presentation by the UN Secretary-General, Ban’s 
Report on UNSMIS/Syria (New York, 6 July 2012), http://un-
report.blogspot.de/2012/07/bans-report-on-unsmis-syria.html 
(accessed 9 March 2018). The UNSMIS mandate ended on 19 
August 2012; due to the escalating violence, the Security 
Council did not extend it. 
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powers as they rightly viewed an agreement at the 
international and regional level as a prerequisite for 
making progress at the local level. In late June 2012, 
Kofi Annan brought together the so-called Action 
Group for Syria in Geneva. The UN and LAS Secre-
taries-General, the foreign ministers of China, France, 
Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, Tur-
key, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar and the EU High Represen-
tative were present. Iran, however, while also an 
important actor was not invited. In Geneva, regional 
and international supporters of regime and opposi-
tion agreed on the Geneva Communiqué – in other 
words, to pacify the conflict through a political tran-
sition to a pluralistic, democratic Syria. This process 
was to be shaped by a transitional governing body 
(TGB) with full executive powers consisting of repre-
sentatives of the regime and the opposition. 
Despite an agreement to resolve the 
conflict politically, the major and 
regional powers continued their 
military support for the adversaries. 
Both mediators were virtually predestined for 
the office.31 They enjoyed exceptional international 
renown, significant diplomatic experience and excel-
lent relations (both in the region and internationally). 
Both also made a strong personal commitment. More-
over, there were no competing mediation missions 
at the time. Yet, their missions consistently lacked 
the unanimous support of the UN Security Council, 
which was divided on key issues with regards to the 
conflict. This particularly concerned Assad’s role: 
should the president have to resign as a precondition 
for negotiations (as the opposition and its supporters 
interpreted both the Geneva Communiqué and the 
Annan Plan to stipulate, although the wording of the 
two documents does not provide for it),32 or should 
 
31 For an evaluation of the two mediation missions, see 
Francesco Mancini and Jose Vericat, Lost in Translation: UN 
Mediation in Libya, Syria and Yemen (New York: International 
Peace Institute, November 2016), 8ff.; Raymond Hinnebusch 
and William Zartman, UN Mediation in the Syrian Crisis: From 
Kofi Annan to Lakhdar Brahimi (New York: International Peace 
Institute, March 2016); Berma Klein Goldewijk, “Internation-
al Mediation in Syria’s Complex War: Strategic Implica-
tions”, in Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies, ed. Paul 
Ducheine and Frans Osinga (The Hague, 2017), 107–23, 
chapter 7.3. 
32 On the Geneva Communiqué, see Action Group for 
Syria, Final Communiqué, 30 June 2012 (see note 17); on Kofi 
he be integrated into a power-sharing arrangement? 
Even when the Security Council adopted the Geneva 
Communiqué with a delay of about a year, the differ-
ent interpretations remained. Russia and China did 
not support calls for Assad’s resignation and, not least 
due to the experience in Libya, rejected any coercive 
measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Only 
these, however, could have provided the necessary 
teeth to the mediation missions. The major and 
regional powers also maintained their military sup-
port for one or other of the adversaries; their agree-
ment on political conflict resolution was thus mean-
ingless. The two mediators also failed to bring all 
relevant local conflict parties and their regional sup-
porters to the negotiating table. Thus, the dominant 
party in the Kurdish territories, the PYD, was excluded 
by Turkey’s veto – a pattern that continues to this 
day in all international negotiating forums – and 
Iran was not allowed to participate because the oppo-
sition, the USA and Saudi Arabia opposed it. 
The UN Mediation Mission: Mandate, 
Approach and Outcome 
On 10 July 2014, the experienced Italian-Swedish 
diplomat and long-time UN staff member Staffan 
de Mistura, who had inter alia led the UN missions 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, was appointed UN Special 
Envoy for Syria. In consultation with the LAS, the 
UN Secretary-General appointed the Egyptian career 
diplomat Ramzy Ezzeldin Ramzy as his deputy. Given 
the escalating violence, the UN mediator wanted 
to find ways to draw international attention back to 
Syria and make the international community – both 
major and regional powers, this time including Iran 
– assume responsibility for engaging in conflict 
resolution. In the absence of an appropriate interna-
tional framework, he viewed talks on power-sharing 
between the Syrian conflict parties, which continued 
to strive for military victory, as less realistic.33 
De Mistura also relied on conflict containment and 
confidence-building through ceasefires. He initially 
attempted to achieve a ceasefire in Syria’s most popu-
 
Annan’s six-point plan, see “Text of Annan’s Six-point Peace 
Plan for Syria”, Reuters, 4 April 2012, https://www.reuters. 
com/article/us-syria-ceasefire/text-of-annans-six-point-peace-
plan-for-syria-idUSBRE8330HJ20120404 (accessed 13 February 
2018). 
33 Author’s interview with Staffan de Mistura, Geneva, 
21 March 2018. 
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lous city, Aleppo, which was partly controlled by the 
rebels and partly by the regime. Success in this sym-
bolic city was meant to illustrate the possibility of 
progress. From the very outset, however, it was clear 
that the parties to the conflict were not prepared to 
compromise precisely because of the high symbolic 
value of the city.34 
In addition, in the first months of his term of office 
de Mistura conducted extensive consultations with 
representatives of the Syrian regime, the opposition, 
women, civil-society groups and a great variety 
of rebel groups to explore possible agreements and 
points of consensus. Participants in the two perma-
nent consultation forums – the Women Advisory 
Board and the Civil Society Support Room – were 
given the opportunity to highlight civil-society, 
humanitarian and women’s concerns, exchange views 
with mission representatives and come into contact 
with potential donors. Yet, the talks left many of 
them with the impression that they ultimately had 
little relevance for the behaviour of the UN mediator, 
the dynamics of the conflict or the indirect conversa-
tions between regime and opposition.35 
It was only after Russia’s direct military interven-
tion that an international agreement on a ceasefire 
and a political transition was reached in Vienna in 
November 2015 on a Russian-American initiative: the 
two objectives were to be pursued in parallel.36 The 
members of the so-called International Syria Support 
Group (ISSG) – in which all relevant international 
and regional actors, including Iran, were represented 
 
34 The Arte documentary by Anne Poiret, Syrie – mission 
impossible, March 2017, http://www.dailymotion.com/video/ 
x5ew3c9 (accessed 23 March 2018), traces in particular the 
efforts towards the so-called Aleppo Freeze and their failure. 
35 Conversations between the author and various members 
of the Civil Society Support Group, February and March 
2018. On the Civil Society Support Room, see also the more 
positive assessment by Sara Hellmüller and Marie-Joëlle 
Zahar, Against the Odds: Civil Society in the Intra-Syrian Talks (New 
York: International Peace Institute, March 2018), https:// 
www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/1803_Against-
the-Odds.pdf (accessed 23 March 2018). 
36 Further factors contributed to a sense of urgency or 
opened up new opportunities: the refugee crisis in Europe in 
autumn 2015, a series of attacks by IS in Europe, the nuclear 
agreement with Iran, which cleared the way for Tehran’s 
participation in international forums, and the assumption 
that Hillary Clinton would win the upcoming US elections, 
which is why Moscow wanted to establish a common 
approach beforehand. 
for the first time – agreed to initiate formal nego-
tiations between the Syrian conflict parties under 
UN mediation by early 2016 at the latest.37 A broad 
spectrum of Syrian representatives was to participate 
in these intra-Syrian negotiations. A resolution to the 
conflict was to ensure the “principles of Syria’s unity, 
independence, territorial integrity and non-sectarian 
character”; preserve state institutions; and guarantee 
the rights of all Syrians regardless of ethnicity or reli-
gious denomination. Six months were set aside for 
the establishment of “credible, inclusive and non-sec-
tarian governance” and for the setting of a timetable 
and modalities for a constitutional process. Within 
18 months, free and fair elections were to take place 
under UN supervision and with the participation of 
all Syrians, including those living in the diaspora. 
De Mistura’s main function at this stage was to 
advise the regional and international parties in such 
a way that an agreement could be reached even with-
out a consensus on Assad’s future. In December 2015, 
the UN Security Council unanimously confirmed in 
Resolution 2254 the transitional roadmap presented 
by the ISSG on the basis of the Geneva Communiqué 
for a “Syrian-led, Syrian-owned political transition 
to end the conflict”. It instructed the special envoy to 
organise talks between the Syrian conflict parties in 
Geneva and to work out a comprehensive ceasefire 
and an appropriate monitoring mechanism.38 IS and 
al-Qaeda offshoots, such as the al-Nusra Front, were 
to be excluded from the ceasefire. Jordan was tasked 
with reaching a consensus in consultation with the 
other ISSG members on which terrorist persons and 
groups would also be the targets of joint action. The 
consensus never came about. The ISSG members had 
incompatible definitions of who was a terrorist and 
 
37 Twenty states and international organisations partici-
pated in the meetings presided by Russia and America 
(China, Egypt, Germany, the EU, France, Iran, Iraq, Italy, 
Jordan, the LAS, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tur-
key, the UAE, the United Kingdom and the UN). See ISSG, 
Statement (Vienna, 14 November 2015), https://reliefweb.int/ 
report/syrian-arab-republic/statement-international-syria-
support-group-vienna-november-14-2015; idem, Final Decla-
ration on the Results of the Syria Talks in Vienna as Agreed by Par-
ticipants (Vienna, 30 November 2015), https://eeas.europa.eu/ 
headquarters/headquarters-homepage/5960_en (both ac-
cessed 9 March 2018). 
38 United Nations Secruity Council, Resolution 2254 (Geneva 
and Vienna, 18 December 2015), http://un-report.blogspot.de/ 
2015/12/security-council-final-draft-esolution.html (accessed 
9 March 2018). 
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who fought for legitimate causes, divergences which 
were characteristic of the differences in the wider 
international community, and which later turned out 
to be an important obstacle in ensuring compliance 
with ceasefires, often legitimising regime offensives. 
De Mistura tried to counter an imminent obstruc-
tion of intra-Syrian talks on the question of whether 
to deal first with terrorism or with a transitional gov-
ernment by proposing four parallel working groups 
to negotiate a framework document for the implemen-
tation of the Geneva Communiqué.39 Still, the intra-
Syrian talks had a difficult start in early February 
2016. De Mistura suspended them two days after the 
launch in the face of renewed escalating violence and 
severe restrictions on humanitarian access, and de-
manded the major powers create an environment 
that would allow negotiations to take place. In fact, 
at his instigation, the ISSG set up a task force each on 
humanitarian issues and ceasefires in mid-February 
2016 (the Humanitarian Task Force was chaired by 
the UN, whilst the Ceasefire Task Force initially had 
Russian and American co-chairs). On 26 February 2016, 
the Security Council adopted Resolution 2268 estab-
lishing a nation-wide ceasefire which held temporarily, 
and improved humanitarian access to contested areas. 
Consequently, de Mistura convened the second 
round of talks in Geneva for mid-March 2016, aiming 
to form a transitional government within six months. 
However, the representatives of the conflict parties 
refused to sit down together beyond the opening of 
these intra-Syrian talks. This meant that there were 
no direct intra-Syrian negotiations at any time; in-
stead de Mistura and his team spoke separately with 
each side.40 Accordingly, the working groups were 
not set up either. Most of the content intended for 
the groups, however, was placed in various thematic 
“baskets”, which de Mistura and his team worked on 
 
39 The topics were: security and protection of the civilian 
population; political and constitutional issues related to 
the TGB; military affairs, security and counter-terrorism; ser-
vices, reconstruction and development. 
40 From early 2016 to mid-September 2018, nine rounds of 
indirect talks took place under UN mediation: 1–3 February, 
14–24 March and 13–27 April 2016 (Geneva), 23 Febru-
ary – 3 March, 23–31 March, 15–19 May, 10–14 July and 
28 November – 15 December 2017 (Geneva), 25/26 January 
2018 (Vienna). The United Nations Office at Geneva, Intra-
Syrian Talks – UN Special Envoy Statements and Press Briefings (as 
of 6 March 2018), https://www.unog.ch/unog/website/news_ 
media.nsf/(httpPages)/A45B5560F87E2336C1257F4700646029? 
OpenDocument (accessed 20 September 2018). 
with the respective delegations. In addition, escalat-
ing violence repeatedly caused long breaks between 
the individual rounds of talks. In September 2016, 
cooperation in the ISSG between the USA and Russia 
broke down. The American Air Force had bombed 
regime positions in Deir el-Zor, and the USA blamed 
Russia for an air attack against a UN aid convoy near 
Aleppo.41 Washington and Moscow then resigned 
their joint presidency of the ISSG ceasefire task force, 
handing it over to the UN mission until further notice. 
The UN mediator was unable to bring 
about either a lasting ceasefire or a 
political solution to the conflict. 
Against this background, the talks made no sub-
stantial progress. In de Mistura’s words in July 2017, 
there was “no breakthrough, no breakdown, no one 
walking out, incremental progress”.42 The talks at 
least nominally committed the opposition and regime 
to the principles of conflict resolution, and in the tech-
nical consultations many of the issues were thoroughly 
deliberated and thought through. Ultimately, how-
ever, the UN mediator was unable to bring about a 
lasting ceasefire (or rather prevent an escalation of 
violence), enforce humanitarian access to besieged 
areas, effectively protect the civilian population or 
even come close to a political solution to the conflict. 
His involvement only allowed him to support the UN 
in exercising its humanitarian role in individual cases 
through diplomacy and negotiations on aid convoys, 
evacuations, ceasefires and the protection of civilians. 
Towards an Explanation – 
Relevant Factors 
International mediation efforts to date have shown 
that the timing of mediation and its acceptance by 
 
41 On the escalation dynamics, see in detail Poiret, Syrie – 
mission impossible (see note 34). The Independent International 
Commission of Inquiry for Syria holds the Syrian Air Force 
responsible for the attack on the convoy. Independent Inter-
national Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Repub-
lic, 2 February 2018, Doc-no. A/HRC/34/64, https://documents- 
dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G17/026/63/PDF/G1702663.pdf? 
OpenElement (accessed 18 May 2018). 
42 “Syria Talks End with ‘Incremental Progress’ But ‘No 
Breakthrough’ – UN Envoy”, UN News, 15 July 2017, https:// 
news.un.org/en/story/2017/07/561612-syria-talks-end-
incremental-progress-no-breakthrough-un-envoy (accessed 
9 March 2018). 
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the conflict parties are important factors for success. 
Another relevant factor is the influence that the 
mission can exert as a result of backing by the inter-
national community, primarily the UN Security Coun-
cil. The latter decides what leverage the mission can 
apply. This influence diminishes when in competi-
tion with other negotiating forums. The specific me-
diation approach (the mediator’s prestige, impartial-
ity, inclusiveness) is also decisive for success or failure.43 
Acceptance and Timing of the Mediation 
The Syrian conflict parties accepted the UN mediator 
and engaged in the mission at least pro forma. They 
also took part in all rounds of talks, albeit with some 
delays and interruptions. However, they showed no 
genuine interest in mediation. At no time were the 
regime and opposition in a situation of mutually 
hurting stalemate in which they might have preferred 
a political conflict resolution to a military one; thus 
the conflict was never even close to being “ripe for 
resolution”.44 The regime did not even give its repre-
sentative in Geneva, Bashar Jaafari, authority to nego-
tiate; he merely acted as a spokesman. 
The direct intervention of 
regional and major powers 
increasingly pushed their own 
interests to the fore. 
On the contrary, external support meant the con-
flict was permanently fuelled with financial assis-
tance, arms, military advisors, etc.45 The significant 
shift in military power that resulted from Russia’s 
direct military intervention also did not push the par-
ties closer to a political settlement. While the Syrian 
opposition became more willing to negotiate and take 
a more pragmatic approach due to the massive military 
setbacks it was suffering, the regime felt less and less 
 
43 UN, Guidance for Effective Mediation (New York, September 
2012), https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/ 
files/GuidanceEffectiveMediation_UNDPA2012%28english% 
29_0.pdf (accessed 17 May 2018). 
44 For the concept of a mutually hurting stalemate applied 
to Syria see Muriel Asseburg, “Seeking Context for Meaning-
ful Negotiations”, Turkish Review 4, no. 2 (March/April 2014): 
126–28, https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/ 
products/medienbeitraege/TR_Vol4_Iss2-_F_Muriel_Asseburg. 
pdf (accessed 9 March 2018). 
45 See Klein Goldewijk, “International Mediation in Syria’s 
Complex War” (see note 31), 107–23 (especially chapter 7.4). 
under pressure to negotiate power-sharing and a po-
litical transition, or to enter into any kind of compro-
mise due to its military success and Russia’s support. 
In addition, intra-Syrian negotiations did not begin 
until the conflict was already highly international-
ised. The direct military intervention of regional and 
major powers increasingly pushed their own interests 
to the fore. However, these could not be dealt with 
during the Geneva talks between the Syrian conflict 
parties. 
The Mediator’s Leverage 
Whilst the talks mediated by the UN were the only 
ones that all relevant actors recognised as legitimate 
and there was ostensibly international consensus on 
the mediation’s mandate (Geneva Communiqué, ISSG 
statements, Security Council Resolution 2254), that 
consensus remained superficial. Also, regional and 
major powers consistently pursued military approaches 
to conflict management. At the same time, largely 
because of Russia’s veto, the Security Council was 
unable to impose coercive measures (sanctions, a no-
fly zone, an arms embargo, the prosecution of war 
crimes or crimes against humanity) that could have 
had an impact on the course of the conflict, served to 
protect the civilian population or helped to establish 
the responsibility of the conflict parties. The mission 
thus had no “coercive power”. 
The efforts of the UN mediator were also challenged 
by the establishment of an alternative format for ne-
gotiation and conflict management. After the regime 
had recaptured Aleppo in December 2016, and with 
a lack of progress in the Geneva negotiations, Russia 
sought to convert its military dominance into achiev-
ing the pacification of Syria. Through the so-called 
Astana process, Russia alongside the regional powers 
of Iran and Turkey wanted to monitor a ceasefire 
announced in December 2016 and resume political 
conflict resolution. Moscow and its two regional 
partners therefore agreed on zones of influence and 
brought representatives of the regime and rebel 
groups to Astana in January 2017. Those talks were 
also indirect. In May 2017, the three guarantors 
agreed on four de-escalation zones in which all firing 
was to cease and humanitarian access was to be 
assured – with the exception of the fight against 
jihadists.46 In subsequent meetings, this de-escalation 
 
46 The four so-called de-escalation zones were: (1) the prov-
ince of Idlib and parts of the provinces of Aleppo, Latakia 
and Hama in the northwest of the country, (2) the rural areas 
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zone approach was further elaborated and specified. 
It did indeed initially lead to a significant reduction 
in violence and improve humanitarian access. How-
ever, it collapsed after only six months, primarily 
because the regime continued to focus on reconquer-
ing territory. By mid-2018, only one de-escalation 
zone was left, after the other three had been retaken 
by the regime. A regime offensive to reconquer Idlib 
province was averted (for the time being) by Turkish-
Russian compromise after international pressure and 
a Turkish show of force. Overall, Russia was unable 
to progress towards a nationwide ceasefire either. 
Its backing for the Syrian army offensives gave the 
strong impression that Russia had anyhow conceived 
of establishing de-escalation zones to allow the regime 
to concentrate its forces elsewhere, before attempting 
to reconquer the entire territory step by step. 
Moscow’s efforts to convene a National Dialogue 
to legitimise conflict resolution through handpicked 
Syrians also failed. The SNC boycotted the meeting in 
Sochi at the end of January 2018 because it did not 
consider Russia to be an honest mediator and because 
Russia’s invitation policy guaranteed a pro-regime 
majority from the outset. The PYD was not represented 
following Turkey’s objection; other Kurds did not 
participate as a protest against the Turkish military 
operation launched just before in Afrin. In turn, the 
regime’s representatives opposed Russian proposals 
for a constitution. Ultimately, Russian mediators 
merely committed the participants to the principles 
of conflict resolution and handed the constitutional 
process back to the UN in Geneva.47 By mid-Septem-
ber 2018, three lists representing the regime, the 
opposition and experts had been prepared, but the 
composition of the committee as well as procedural 
and substantative issues related to the constitutional 
process remained contested by the conflict parties.48 
 
of northern Homs, (3) the eastern suburbs of Damascus (east-
ern Ghouta) and (4) the area in the southwest of the country 
bordering Jordan and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. 
47 See Yuri Barmin, “The Syrian Congress in Sochi: Too 
Much Too Soon”, Russian International Affairs Council, 2 Feb-
ruary 2018, http://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-
comments/analytics/the-syrian-congress-in-sochi-too-much-
too-soon/ (accessed 27 February 2018); Cengiz Çandar, “Sochi 
Summit Exposes Limitations of Moscow’s Syria Policy”, 
Al-Monitor, 3 February 2018, https://www.al-monitor.com/ 
pulse/originals/2018/02/turkey-russia-syria-sochi-summit-
revealed-limitations.html (accessed 26 February 2018). 
48 See “Briefing to the UN Security Council by the Special 
Envoy of the UN Secretary-General for Syria, Mr. Staffan de 
Although Russia stressed from the outset that its 
efforts complemented the UN mediation, it never-
theless undermined it.49 First, Russia diverted local, 
regional and international attention and energy to 
Astana, devaluing the Geneva talks. Second, Russia 
upended the transition roadmap agreed in the 
Geneva Communiqué and Security Council Resolu-
tion 2254 (in the following order: ceasefire, establish-
ment of a TGB of representatives of the government 
and opposition, drafting a new constitution, and 
finally parliamentary and presidential elections) by 
initiating the constitutional process without there 
having been a transition government first. The pres-
entation of a draft constitution drawn up by Russia 
was contrary to the principle of local ownership. 
Staffan de Mistura nevertheless decided to play along 
with the game of complementarity, since only Russia 
and its Astana partners were capable of enforcing 
ceasefires on the ground.50 Simultaneously, he insisted 
that Astana was not a format for political negotia-
tions but only for ceasefires and that the constitu-
tional process would have to be brought back under 
the aegis of the UN. By attending most of the meet-
ings in Astana and Sochi, he also intended to signal 
that the two processes were complementary. Yet, as 
a result, the political process was basically reduced 
to the constitutional committee’s work. 
The major powers adopted different attitudes 
towards the UN mediator. While Russia sent the 
renowned expert Vitaly Naumkin as an advisor to 
de Mistura, the White House showed no interest in 
sending a representative to support or influence 
the UN efforts.51 Under President Trump, the US also 
downgraded its presence on the Ceasefire Task Force, 
no longer sending any military representatives. 
 
Mistura’”, 18 September 2018, https://www.unog.ch/unog/ 
website/news_media.nsf/(httpNewsByYear_en)/30AA6AD72 
752F5BFC125830D002A0040?OpenDocument (accessed 
20 September 2018). 
49 See Marc Semo, “Paix en Syrie: deux initiatives de pour-
parlers complémentaires, mais potentiellement concur-
rentes”, Le Monde, 25 January 2018, http://www.lemonde.fr/ 
syrie/article/2018/01/25/negociations-sur-la-syrie-un-dernier-
espoir-pour-la-paix_5247014_1618247.html (accessed 
9 March 2018). 
50 Author’s interview with de Mistura, Geneva, 21 March 
2018. 
51 Author’s interview with a leading US expert on Syria, 
February 2018. 
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Perceptions of the Mediator 
By choosing de Mistura, the UN nominated a respected 
and crisis-tested diplomat who had many years of 
experience as a “trouble shooter” at the UN.52 He was 
given as assistant an Egyptian diplomat with excellent 
contacts in the Arab world, including the Syrian 
regime. Despite his qualities, de Mistura did not have 
the prestige or prominence of his predecessors, a fact 
that initially seemed to make it difficult for him to 
access decision-makers in Turkey and the Gulf States. 
However, at the time those states had little interest in 
a negotiated conflict settlement anyway.53 De Mistura 
was criticised for not pushing the mediation forwards 
vigorously or systematically enough, but beginning 
instead by establishing a broad network of contacts 
and holding a large number of consultations, the ob-
jectives of which were not always clear.54 Team mem-
bers describe his style as improvisational, slow and 
lacking in ambition; he is characterised rather as re-
active, following the initiatives of the major powers 
rather than taking the lead and accelerating the 
pace.55 Relations between him and UN headquarters 
were said to be tense at times. Secretaries-General 
(in particular António Guterres) have repeatedly 
criticised the stagnating process, but left open whether 
their criticism was aimed primarily at de Mistura or 
at the lack of support from the Security Council and 
the ISSG. 
Although opposition representatives recognised 
de Mistura’s negotiating skills, they questioned his 
impartiality,56 inter alia because the UN mission 
 
52 Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International 
Cooperation, Curriculum Vitae: Deputy Minister Staffan de 
Mistura, https://www.esteri.it/mae/en/ministero/viceministri_ 
subsecretaries/mistura/ (accessed 9 March 2018). 
53 Author’s interview with Staffan de Mistura, Geneva, 
21 March 2018.  
54 Author’s interview with a high-ranking European 
diplomat, February 2018. 
55 Author’s interview with advisors of the special envoy, 
February 2018. See “Former Adviser Slams UN Envoy to 
Syria’s Aleppo Plan”, Al-Jazeera, 23 March 2015, https://www. 
aljazeera.com/news/2015/04/adviser-slams-envoy-syria-
aleppo-plan-150423153630447.html (accessed 12 March 
2018); Somini Sengupta, “Iran Nuclear Talks Open a Tangled 
Path to Ending Syria’s War”, New York Times, 4 May 2015, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/04/world/middleeast/iran-
nuclear-talks-open-a-tangled-path-to-ending-syrias-war.html 
(accessed 12 March 2018). 
56 Author’s interview with SNC representatives, February 
2018. 
maintains a presence in areas under regime control 
as well as contacts with the regime. Criticism of other 
UN agencies cooperating with Damascus was also 
blamed on de Mistura. There was also disagreement 
with statements made by the mediator and his en-
tourage: their “neutral” presentation of the conflict 
dynamics on the ground, which did not clearly attri-
bute responsibilities and concealed asymmetry, for 
example in war crimes, was seen as contributing to 
a distorted narrative.57 The fact that the mission was 
ultimately impotent in the face of war crimes dimin-
ished its credibility, especially in the eyes of Syrian 
civil-society actors. On several occasions, however, 
the special envoy himself made remarks which the 
opposition considered biased and inappropriate.58 
Moreover, his participation in the so-called National 
Dialogue in Sochi, organised by the Astana powers, 
was disapproved of by the opposition gathered in 
the SNC, which boycotted the meeting.59 
In general, the mediator delegated relations 
with opposition bodies to members of his team and 
refrained from attending even crucial opposition 
forums, such as the Riyadh I and Riyadh II Confer-
ences (December 2015, November 2017). He was 
therefore unable to establish close and trusting con-
tacts with the opposition, and regime opponents 
gained the impression that he was exerting consider-
ably more pressure on them than on the regime.60 
Nevertheless, opposition representatives considered 
the UN mission to be much less biased than Russian 
mediation, Russia siding so clearly with the regime 
and thus becoming a party to the conflict. According-
ly, they argued that it would be advantageous to have 
an internationally legitimate format in which the 
 
57 Author’s interview with participants in the Civil Society 
Support Group, February 2018. 
58 Author’s interview with high-ranking diplomats in 
the Syrian opposition, February 2018; see also Tom Miles, 
“Syrian Opposition Must Accept It Has Not Won the War: 
U.N.”, Reuters, 6 September 2017, https://www.reuters.com/ 
article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-un/syrian-opposition-must-
accept-it-has-not-won-the-war-u-n-idUSKCN1BH1MC (accessed 
14 March 2018). 
59 See Patrick Wintour, “Russia-backed Syrian Peace Talks 
Agree Deal on New Constitution”, The Guardian, 31 January 
2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/31/russia-
backed-syrian-peace-talks-deal-constitution-un (accessed 
9 March 2018). 
60 Author’s interview with representatives of the SNC, Feb-
ruary 2018, and high-ranking European diplomats, February 
2018. 
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details of conflict resolution could be negotiated in 
due course, even if current negotiations did not pro-
duce results.61 The regime itself repeatedly tried to 
discredit de Mistura in the Syrian state press. It had 
no interest in establishing relationships of trust and 
frequently demonstrated its condescension – for 
example by leaking a video recorded at the indirect 
talks showing Syrian representative Jaafari appearing 
to lecture de Mistura, which it uploaded to YouTube 
in autumn 2017. 
Inclusiveness and Representativeness 
The indirect intra-Syrian talks in Geneva gradually 
included more and more groups, at least on the oppo-
sition side, by extending the negotiating delegation in 
Riyadh under the umbrella of the SNC.62 Yet, they still 
excluded a significant number of the rebels (not just 
from IS and HTS, but others as well) because they 
refused to join or were not invited. This was particu-
larly problematic because these groups were in con-
trol of a significant proportion of the areas not held 
by the government. In fact, in the summer of 2018 
the excluded Kurdish party PYD controlled consider-
ably more territory than the opposition rebels. More 
seriously still, there was no forum for mediation 
where the regional powers would have been able to 
strike a balance between their conflicting interests 
or at least reach an agreement on a minimal code 
of conduct, for example on maintaining ceasefires. 
Conclusions, Prospects and Recommen-
dations for European Approaches 
The approach of the UN mediation in Syria, as well 
as the UN/LAS mediation before it, was to contain 
the civil war and stabilise the country sustainably 
by establishing power-sharing between regime and 
opposition, as well as a Syrian-led political transition 
 
61 Ibid. See also Patrick Wintour, “Syrian Groups Urge UN 
Boycott of Putin-hosted Conference”, The Guardian, 4 January 
2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/04/syrian-
groups-urge-un-boycott-of-putin-hosted-conference (accessed 
14 March 2018). 
62 On the composition of the Syrian Negotiating Commis-
sion following the merger in late autumn 2017, see Benja-
min Barthe, “L’opposition syrienne à Genève: une union de 
façade”, Le Monde, 28 November 2017, http://www.lemonde.fr/ 
syrie/article/2017/11/28/l-opposition-syrienne-a-geneve-une-
union-de-facade_5221629_1618247.html (accessed 14 March 
2018). 
to a more inclusive and representative political sys-
tem. In this vein, parallel talks were held on cease-
fires on the one hand and power-sharing and political 
transition on the other. However, neither UN media-
tor Staffan de Mistura nor his two predecessors, Kofi 
Annan or Lakhdar Brahimi, succeeded in bringing the 
Syrian conflict parties together for substantive nego-
tiations. Even in indirect talks, de Mistura was unable 
to make any progress on power-sharing and political 
transition, or to contribute to a lasting pacification 
of the conflict and effective protection of the civilian 
population. Only selective agreements on ceasefires, 
aid deliveries and evacuations were concluded. Ulti-
mately, military dynamics determined the scope and 
pace of UN mediation throughout. Given the inter-
nationalisation of the conflict, it was largely obvious 
from the outset that the intra-Syrian talks would not 
see progress. Also, none of the regional or major 
powers focused on protecting Syrian civilians or on 
achieving sustainable conflict resolution. No respon-
sibility for war crimes or crimes against humanity 
has been established.63 
The UN mission was faced with the 
dilemma of either legitimising 
the Russian approach or distancing 
itself and giving up opportunities 
for influence. 
While Russia prevented coercive measures against 
the Assad regime from the outset, its direct military 
intervention since September 2015 has increasingly 
made it a force shaping the Syrian order. It supported 
a military victory for the regime – in sharp contrast 
to its proclaimed goal of resolving the conflict by 
negotiating power-sharing and a political transition. 
It intended to legitimise itself on the ground as well 
as internationally by implementing isolated elements 
of Security Council Resolution 2254, namely consti-
tutional reform and elections. Thus, the UN mission 
was confronted with a dilemma: if it served as a fig 
leaf for the Russian approach of predominantly mili-
tary conflict resolution, it would at least remain “in 
play”, and be able to hold preliminary talks on the 
future order in Syria and selectively contribute to 
improving the humanitarian situation. If it ceased its 
 
63 The establishment of various international investigative 
bodies to document the facts gives at least some reason to 
hope that this will be pursued through legal channels in the 
future. 
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efforts and clearly distanced itself from the Russian 
approach, it would deprive itself of the few opportu-
nities to exert influence that it possessed. De Mistura 
decided on the first approach. 
Three factors were (and are) key among the many 
factors blocking the success of UN mediation in Syria. 
First, the international community agreed on political 
conflict resolution in principle, but third parties de 
facto continued to back military support for the con-
flict parties and increasingly enforced their own inter-
ests through direct military intervention. This led to 
a situation in which a favourable mediation environ-
ment could not emerge in the sense of the conflict 
becoming ripe for resolution. Rather, the conflict dy-
namics made this possibility increasingly remote. 
Second, while the Syrian conflict parties accepted the 
UN’s mediation and participated in the Geneva talks, 
they did so purely pro forma. They were not willing 
to enter into substantive negotiations, but relied 
instead on enforcing their interests militarily, albeit 
with clear differences between the regime and oppo-
sition. The opposition delegation acted much more 
constructively in the indirect talks than the regime 
and became increasingly pragmatic as its military 
strength diminished.64 Third, the disparate positions 
in the Security Council, particularly between Russia 
and the West, prevented effective coercive meas-
ures – such as UN sanctions, an arms embargo, the 
imposition of a no-fly zone or the deployment of UN 
observers or even a peacekeeping force – that would 
have put pressure on the parties to the conflict, pre-
vented human rights violations and helped to calm 
the conflict. 
Factors originating in the approach chosen by the 
mediation mission clearly have less significance here. 
Thus, an earlier start to the intra-Syrian talks, a higher 
degree of inclusiveness and representativeness of the 
forums (for instance, by including a PYD delegation) 
or a more energetic mediator would not have made 
a decisive difference. 
Due to these factors, a successful conclusion to 
the UN mediation under the terms of its mandate and 
thus a “Syrian-owned, Syrian-led” process can also be 
excluded for the future. To begin with, the issue of 
reconciling regional and international interests in 
Syria is key to ending the armed confrontations. How-
ever, no format exists for this. The intra-Syrian talks 
 
64 Author’s interview with Staffan de Mistura, Geneva, 
21 March 2018; conversations with several of the mediator’s 
advisors in January, February and March 2018. 
are not suitable for it; important regional powers, 
especially Israel and Saudi Arabia, lack representation 
in the Astana format; and Russia, itself a party to the 
conflict, has so far shown no willingness to bring 
about a comprehensive arrangement. Given the cur-
rent US-Russian tensions, it is also unrealistic to 
expect that these conflicts of interest would be dealt 
with constructively in a revived ISSG or in a format 
resembling the 2016 Lausanne meeting.65 
European members of the so-called Small Group66 
should employ their respective diplomatic channels 
to push the regional and international players to-
wards conduct that serves de-escalation and is in con-
formity with international (humanitarian) law, thus 
avoiding further military spill-over effects and pro-
tecting Syria’s civilian population. They should also 
make use of any opportunities by working towards 
conflict resolution: for instance, by using Iran’s in-
terest in maintaining the nuclear agreement (JCPOA) 
to ensure that Tehran reduces its direct and indirect 
presence in Syria, especially in the border area with 
Israel and Jordan; refrain from provoking Israel; and 
exert pressure on the Assad regime to agree to a nego-
tiated settlement. The incentives at the disposal of the 
EU and its member states towards Damascus – recog-
nising it by once again posting ambassadors, suspend-
ing sanctions, committing to reconstruction – should 
be used strategically to bring about a more inclusive 
political system and prevent serious human-rights 
abuses and discrimination in future. In this vein, the 
EU and its member states should also give political 
backing to legal proceedings to determine the respon-
sibility for war crimes and promote their success by 
making resources available for fact-finding and legal 
assistance. 
 
65 Lausanne is where the foreign ministers of the USA, 
Russia and seven of the regional and neighbouring countries 
that are the most important for Syria (Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jor-
dan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey) met in October 2016. 
See Lesley Wroughton and Alexander Winning, “Syrian 
Talks in Lausanne End without Breakthrough”, Reuters, 
15 October 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-
crisis-syria-talks/syria-talks-in-lausanne-end-without-break 
through-idUSKBN12E2GQ?il=0 (accessed 14 March 2018). 
66 The “Small Group”, formed in Paris in April 2018, con-
sists of France, Jordan, Germany, the United Kingdom, the 
USA, and Saudi Arabia. 
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Among the countries affected by the so-called Arab 
Spring, Yemen is the only one where a president in 
office was deposed by a power-sharing agreement. 
In March 2011, Saudi Arabia launched an initiative 
within the Gulf Cooperation Council to prevent an 
escalation of the violence. UN Special Envoy Jamal 
Benomar played a leading role in the negotiations. 
When the negotiating parties signed the Gulf Agree-
ment in November 2011, thus launching a process of 
political transition, the sponsors of the deal believed 
civil war had been averted in Yemen. In spring 2014 
the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and its im-
plementation were still being feted as a model for the 
region. They were regarded as the UN’s showpiece for 
successful conflict mediation. 
That the negotiating parties reached agreement 
over the Gulf Initiative is a UN mediation success. 
However, the civil war that it was meant to prevent 
was merely delayed by the deal. By the time the tran-
sitional government (formed in December 2011) was 
overthrown by Ansarallah (also referred to as Houthi 
movement or Houthis) in January 2015, the Agree-
ment had obviously failed. The UN special envoy’s 
attempts to persuade Ansarallah to return to the po-
litical process were unproductive. 
In spring 2015, Saudi Arabia forged a ten-state 
coalition for military intervention, with the alleged 
goal of re-establishing the transitional government in 
Sana’a so as to allow the political process to continue 
within the framework of the GCC Initiative. Three 
years later, the intervention, intended as a short mili-
tary operation, has got no closer to realising its stra-
tegic aims. In the meantime, Yemen has developed 
into the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, with 22 
million people in need of aid. The UN has made hardly 
any progress in peace talks. In September 2018, the 
new UN Special Envoy, the Briton Martin Griffiths, 
issued invitations to the most recent round of peace 
talks in Geneva. As the first attempt to launch talks 
since summer 2016, the talks were highly anticipated 
both by the Yemeni population and the international 
community. But the no-show of the Houthi media-
tors, after their demands were not met by the UN, 
proved the pessimists ahead of the talks right. While 
the current UN envoy was able to resume dialogue 
with the Houthis, who had refused for over half a 
year to speak to his predecessor, Ismail Ould Cheikh 
Ahmed, tangible mediation successes remain out of 
reach. Not least due to a lack of progress, the latter 
resigned in February 2018. This chapter focuses on 
the following issues: what factors have contributed 
to the failure of the power-sharing agreement? Why 
has the UN mission not been able to bring the conflict 
parties back to the negotiating table and pacify the 
conflict? 
The first section will examine the conflict dynam-
ics at the local, regional and international level. This 
demonstrates both the difficult conditions under 
which the UN mediates in Yemen and the network of 
interests that will have to be included in a successful 
conflict resolution. The second section is dedicated to 
the UN mediation mission, determining two phases: 
first, the negotiation and implementation of the Gulf 
Agreement, and then the attempt by the UN mission 
to encourage the conflict parties to resume the politi-
cal process. 
The Disintegration of a Nation-State 
Seven years after the countrywide protests against 
the rule of Ali Abdullah Saleh, the political map of 
Yemen has permanently changed. A power vacuum 
at the national level and constantly changing local, 
regional and international alliances have greatly 
limited the influence of the former political elite. 
A unified nation-state has de facto ceased to exist. 
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In March 2011, the Gulf Cooperation 
Council focused on the conflict 
amongst the elite in Sana’a, 
neglecting conflicts on 
the country’s periphery. 
The root causes of today’s conflict are a power 
struggle within the political elite in Sana’a, which 
has descended into violence since 2011; and con-
flicts between that elite and the Houthis in northern 
Yemen as well as the independence movement 
in southern Yemen, the Southern Movement (also 
known as al-Hirak). In March 2011 the Gulf Coopera-
tion Council focused on the conflict amongst the elite 
in Sana’a, neglecting conflicts on the country’s pe-
riphery. The GCC Initiative merely provided for the 
deposition of President Ali Abdullah Saleh in exc-
hange for his immunity, and power-sharing between 
government and opposition parties. At the time, 
the opposition parties took the form of an alliance 
headed by the Islah Party. The latter consists mainly 
of groups that were close to the regime – including 
the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood, Salafists, northern 
Yemeni tribes and conservative businessmen. The UN 
special envoy to Yemen, the EU and the US backed 
the negotiations. In November 2011 the government 
and opposition parties signed the agreement and an 
implementation mechanism for a two-year-long tran-
sition process.1 On the basis of the agreement, Abdu 
Rabu Mansour Hadi was nominated as the consensus 
candidate for interim president, and a unity govern-
ment was formed. The implementation mechanism of 
the agreement also included measures on transitional 
justice, security-sector reform and a national dialogue 
aimed at deciding the structure of the state and paci-
fying intrastate conflicts. 
 
1 See Agreement on the Implementation Mechanism for the 
Transition Process in Yemen in Accordance with the Initiative of 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 5 December 2011, https:// 
peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/YE_111205_
Agreement%20on%20the%20implementation%20mechanism
%20for%20the%20transition.pdf (accessed 23 March 2018). 
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Although the Yemeni elite agreed to abide by 
the rules stipulated by the GCC Initiative, during the 
implementation of the agreement each faction of 
the elite pursued its own interests so as to maintain 
or expand its position of power. They used their 
networks in the military, political parties, tribes 
and media. The fact that not one of the elite groups 
was really interested in sharing power was one of 
the main reasons for the failure of the agreement.2 
Local groups, first and foremost the Houthis and the 
Southern Movement, seized the chance to create new 
facts on the ground. As a result, the claim to power 
of the internationally recognised government under 
Hadi is being challenged throughout the country, 
and state and armed forces are fragmented. 
Meanwhile, actors not involved in the GCC Initia-
tive now dominate and therefore neither feel respon-
sible for its success nor champion its implementation. 
In the northwest of the country and in its capital, 
Houthis are the dominant force today. Following an 
alliance with former President Saleh and his networks 
in the military, tribes and media, the group was able 
to spread rapidly in northern Yemen using force from 
mid-2014, and in September 2014 they conquered the 
capital. This cooperation with Saleh was new: from 
2004 to 2010, the Houthis had been at war with the 
Saleh government, rebelling against the marginalisa-
tion of Zaidi3 Saada in the north of the country and 
condemning the government’s involvement in the 
US’s war on terror. In 2001 the Houthis had joined 
the countrywide protests against Saleh, and from 
2013 onwards they were involved in the formal politi-
cal process as part of the National Dialogue. However, 
by September 2014, Saleh had entered into an alli-
ance with them in order to weaken his opponents – 
interim president Hadi and the Islah Party – by 
taking advantage of the ideologically charged power 
conflict between the nominally Sunni Islah Party 
and the Zaidi Houthis. Since 2011, the Islah Party 
had profited from the changes and gained in political 
influence, which was one of the reasons why it be-
came a target for the Houthis. In autumn 2014, the 
 
2 Mareike Transfeld, Yemen: GCC Roadmap to Nowhere, 
SWP Comments 20/2014 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, May 2014). 
3 Zaiidiyah is a religious movement that is categorised as 
belonging to Shi’a Islam; in practice, however, it is closer to 
the Shafi’i school of Sunni Islam than to other Shi’a tradi-
tions. 
Houthis destroyed the military capacities of the Islah 
Party almost entirely. 
The Houthi-Saleh alliance also mobilised the popu-
lation against Hadi. Accusations of corruption and 
the argument that Hadi’s legitimacy had expired with 
his term of office (limited to two years) in February 
2014 met with broad approval. The Houthis were able 
to portray themselves as a popular force and deprive 
the Hadi government of power in a coup d’état, which 
was consummated with Hadi’s provisional resigna-
tion in January 2015 and the creation of the Houthi 
Revolutionary Committee in February 2015. The 
Saudi-led military intervention against the Houthi-
Saleh alliance in the following month welded the 
alliance even more tightly. The Houthis and the Gen-
eral People’s Congress under Saleh further consoli-
dated their rule in the north and presented them-
selves as the rightful government.4 However, their 
alliance was merely pragmatic, and has been visibly 
fracturing since mid-2017. Saleh repeatedly signalled 
to the Saudis that he was prepared to talk. After re-
voking his alliance with the Houthis, he was murdered 
on 4 December 2017. Many of his supporters were 
detained or killed by the Houthis.5 
The regions outside of the Houthi-
controlled northwest are politically 
and militarily fragmented. 
The regions outside of the Houthi-controlled north-
west are politically and militarily fragmented.6 The 
dominant actors there, such as local tribes, militias 
and other groups, although hostile to the Houthis, do 
not unconditionally recognise the Hadi government. 
 
4 Jillian Schwedler, “Yemeni Parliamentarians Vote to 
Form a New Government” (Atlantic Council, 17 August 
2016), http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/ 
yemeni-parliamentarians-vote-to-form-a-new-government 
(accessed 23 March 2018). 
5 April Longley Alley, “Collapse of the Houthi-Saleh 
Alliance and the Future of Yemen’s War”, in Politics, Govern-
ance, and Reconstruction in Yemen, POMEPS Studies 29, ed. 
Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS) (January 
2018), https://pomeps.org/2018/01/11/collapse-of-the-houthi-
saleh-alliance-and-the-future-of-yemens-war/ (accessed 
23 March 2018). 
6 Peter Salisbury, Yemen’s Southern Powder Keg (London: Chat-
ham House, March 2018), https://www.chathamhouse.org/ 
sites/default/files/publications/research/2018-03-27-yemen-
southern-powder-keg-salisbury-final.pdf (accessed 10 June 
2018). 
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What united them at the beginning of the Saudi-led 
intervention was defence against the expanding 
Houthi-Saleh alliance. This also explains their sup-
port for the military intervention by the coalition. In 
turn, the Saudi-led coalition supplied local militias 
with money, weapons and training, thereby de facto 
undermining the authority of the Hadi government. 
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) benefited 
from the conflict, which pushed resistance groups 
into entering into strategic alliances with it against 
the Houthis.7 Since summer 2015, Aden has been 
considered the nominal capital of the Hadi govern-
ment, but as Hadi himself enjoys hardly any support 
in the Southern Movement-dominated city, security 
concerns prevent him from actually governing from 
there. 
The southern independence movement supported 
the intervention not out of loyalty towards Hadi, but 
primarily to protect the south from a takeover by 
a northern Yemeni force, i.e. the Houthi-Saleh alli-
ance.8 The Southern Movement was formed in 2007 
out of a loose movement of retired officers from the 
formerly independent South Yemen, which has been 
demanding independence since at least 2009. In 2011 
the movement also joined the countrywide protests 
against Saleh. However, when the National Dialogue 
began in March 2013, the Southern Movement was 
marginalised. It saw the implementation of the GCC 
Initiative as a northern Yemeni process that did not 
acknowledge the south’s interest in an independent 
state. After Hadi had fled from the Houthis to Aden 
in February 2015 and withdrawn his resignation, he 
and the Southern Movement appeared to form an alli-
 
7 International Crisis Group (ICG), Yemen’s al-Qaeda: Expand-
ing the Base, Middle East and North Africa Report no. 174 
(Brussels, 2 February 2017), https://www.crisisgroup.org/ 
middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/ 
174-yemen-s-al-qaeda-expanding-base (accessed 23 March 
2018). 
8 Susanne Dahlgren and Anne-Linda Amira Augustin, 
“The Multiple Wars in Yemen” (Middle East Research and 
Information Project [MERIP], 18 June 2015), http://www. 
merip.org/multiple-wars-yemen; Martin Jerrett, “Rise, Fall, 
and Rise Again”, in Addressing Security Sector Reform in Yemen, 
CARPO Report 04, ed. Marie-Christine Heinze (Bonn: Center 
for Applied Research in Partnership with the Orient [CARPO], 
20 December 2017), 27–32, http://carpo-bonn.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2017/12/carpo_policy_report_04_2017.pdf (both ac-
cessed 23 March 2018). 
ance.9 In reality, however, the Southern Movement 
has used the conflict configuration to shore up its 
own position and has taken further steps towards 
an autonomous South Yemen since the military in-
tervention. In May 2017, the Southern Transitional 
Council was established in Aden, which claims power 
over the entire south. This fragmentation of the 
national state has been decisively driven forward 
bySaudi and UAE support for the various groups 
fighting the Houthis. 
The Gulf Cooperation Council: 
From Mediator to Conflict Party 
The states of the Gulf Cooperation Council were the 
first external actors to seek a resolution to the con-
flict, from 2011 onwards. Saudi Arabia, whose royal 
family had an ambivalent relationship with Saleh and 
was concerned about the escalating violence between 
elites in the neighbouring country, took the lead. It 
saw itself as a mediator and regularly offered to host 
negotiations. However, it was the UN special envoy 
who undertook the detailed negotiation of the agree-
ment and mediated during the implementation of the 
GCC Initiative. At the same time, Saudi Arabia did not 
limit its action in Yemen to this multilateral frame-
work provided by the GCC Initiative, but also tried to 
influence Yemeni politics unilaterally, especially as 
regards Saudi opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood 
and its rivalry with Iran. The military intervention – 
which continues to be of questionable legitimacy10 
since Riyadh merely refers to Hadi’s call for help of 
23 March 2015 – should also be seen in this context. 
After Hadi had fled the capital to the south, he feared 
for his life when fighters of the Houthi-Saleh alliance 
were entering Aden, and appealed to the Gulf Co-
operation Council to use military means against the 
Houthis. Saudi Arabia claimed to be pursuing the 
goal of re-establishing the legitimate president, Hadi, 
 
9 Mohamed Ghobari and Mohammed Mukhashaf, 
“Yemen’s Hadi Flees to Aden and Says He Is Still President”, 
Reuters, 21 February 2015. 
10 See, e.g., the discussion of the military intervention and 
its legal basis by Arabian Rights Watch Association, “An Ille-
gitimate Coalition, Restoring an Illegitimate President, with 
an Illegitimate War, Using Illegitimate Measures”, 2018, 
http://arwarights.org/political-rights-violations/, or Joe Dyke, 
“Is the Saudi War on Yemen Legal?”, Irin, 3 April 2015, 
https://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2015/04/03/saudi-war-
yemen-legal (both accessed 23 March 2018). 
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in Sana’a and continuing the UN-led political process. 
This stated aim secured Saudi Arabia the support 
of the international community for its military inter-
vention. However, the royal family is also pursuing its 
interest in preventing the spread of Iran’s influence 
in Yemen. Domestic political motivations also play a 
part. The Saudi King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz had died 
two months before the invasion; the defence minister 
and son of the new king, Mohammed bin Salman, 
manoeuvred himself into a more favourable position 
during the succession conflict through the Yemeni 
military campaign.11 Saudi Arabia expected to reach 
its war objectives relatively quickly,12 but more than 
three years later, not one of them has been realised. 
The coalition conducting the military intervention 
in Yemen since March 2015 mainly consists of Sunni 
Arab states, many of whom are involved only sym-
bolically. They tend to be more interested in good 
relations with Saudi Arabia than in Yemen itself. 
The main purpose of the coalition is thus to provide 
a multilateral framework for the intervention and 
strengthen Saudi Arabia’s position vis-à-vis Iran.13 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE form the core of the coa-
lition, but pursue different strategies, operate in 
different deployment zones, and support divergent 
groups. 
Saudi Arabia’s priority in Yemen is to defeat the 
Houthis in order to reinstall Hadi in Sana’a. It has 
primarily relied on air attacks and a sea, land and 
air blockade that aims to put pressure on the Houthis 
and prevent them from receiving weapons from Iran. 
However, Iranian arms have nevertheless reached 
Houthi hands even since the 2015 intervention. UN 
experts view the blockade as a deliberate measure to 
bring about starvation as an instrument of war.14 The 
blockade has contributed significantly to the dramatic 
humanitarian crisis, since the coalition has also dras-
tically restricted food imports and the distribution 
of humanitarian aid. The air raids on military targets 
 
11 Bruce Riedel, “Yemen’s War Shakes Up the Saudi 
Palace”, Markaz (online), 29 April 2015, https://www. 
brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2015/04/29/yemens-war-shakes-
up-the-saudi-palace/ (accessed 26 June 2018). 
12 Author’s interview with Yemeni diplomat (Skype), 
20 November 2017; Sebastian Sons, Auf Sand gebaut. Saudi-
Arabien – ein problematischer Verbündeter (Berlin, 2016), 116. 
13 James Stavridis, “The Arab NATO”, Foreign Policy (online), 
9 April 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/09/the-arab-
nato-saudi-arabia-iraq-yemen-iran/ (accessed 26 June 2018). 
14 UN Security Council, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on 
Yemen, S/2018/68, 26 January 2018, 53. 
have weakened Saleh’s network in particular. Yet 
Saudi Arabia has not been able to deprive the Houthis 
of their power; not even after the death of Saleh, 
which meant the loss of the Houthis’ strongest backer. 
Although the Hadi government continues to exist in 
Saudi exile, it has now lost support in Yemen itself. 
The UAE’s main focus is on the south, where they 
have troops on the ground. A key interest is control-
ling the port of Aden. UAE troops managed to recap-
ture the town from the Houthis in summer 2015 with 
the support of Southern Movement fighters. Since 
the Islah Party mainly consists of the Yemeni Muslim 
Brotherhood and is utterly unsuitable for the UAE as 
a cooperation partner in the south, the Emirates rely 
on the Southern Movement. They thus promote its 
quest for independence and contribute to the creation 
of parallel structures. The UAE also maintained a rela-
tionship with former president Saleh through con-
tacts with his son Ahmed Ali, who is based in Abu 
Dhabi.15 Unlike Saudi Arabia, the Emirates continued 
to see Saleh as part of a possible solution in northern 
Yemen, despite his alliance with the Houthis. The 
UAE also take more decisive action against AQAP 
in southern Yemen than their Saudi partner. Saudi 
Arabia watched the expansion of AQAP more passively, 
inter alia no doubt because AQAP opposed the Houthis. 
The two Gulf states are united in their wish to push 
back Iran’s influence in Yemen. 
Since Saleh’s death in late 2017 and the conflict 
between the Southern Transitional Council in Aden 
and the Hadi government in early January 2018, 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been increasingly 
forced to find common ground. Since May 2018, they 
have jointly powered an offensive against the port of 
Hodeidah, which the international community fears 
will dramatically worsen the humanitarian situation. 
Griffiths’ attempts to stop the offensive through 
mediation were inconclusive. With the failure of 
the Geneva talks in early September 2018, violence 
around Hodeidah has once again escalated.16 The 
coalition hopes the offensive on Hodeidah port will 
bring the Houthis to their knees, as it would allow 
cutting off supply routes from the port to Sana’a. The 
port is an important transhipment centre for relief 
goods, but is also considered a major source of in-
 
15 “UAE ‘Looking to Ditch’ Yemen’s President Hadi 
for Saleh”, The New Arab, 15 July 2017. 
16 “Saudi-UAE Alliance Launches Fresh Offensive on 
Yemen’s Hodeidah”, Al-Jazeera, 18 September 2018. 
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come for the Houthis and a possible entry point for 
smuggled Iranian weapons. 
The Houthis are not merely carrying 
out orders from Iran. 
Saudi Arabia sees the Houthis’ success in capturing 
the capital Sana’a and in threatening Riyadh with 
their missiles as the direct result of Iranian support. 
Since the 2011 protests, ties between the Houthis and 
Iran have intensified. The former have received media 
and military training from Lebanese Hezbollah, which 
is funded by Tehran. However, the Houthis are not 
merely carrying out orders from Iran. While Tehran 
welcomed the Houthi takeover of Sana’a, it warned 
them off further expansion south of Sana’a.17 In 
fact, Saudi policy in Yemen has also contributed to 
strengthening the Houthis ever since Riyadh ended its 
support for the Houthis’ greatest adversary, the Islah 
Party, in March 2013 and weakened the Party by halt-
ing regular payments to it and its supporters among 
the tribes.18 Direct relations between the Houthis and 
Iran were expanded especially after the Houthi take-
over in September 2014: Iran announced regular 
flights between Tehran and Sana’a as well as infra-
structure projects for electricity supply. UN experts 
also assume that Iran supplies the Houthis with 
weapons, including missiles.19 Ever since the disso-
lution of the nuclear agreement by President Trump 
first loomed in February 2018, Iran has shown itself 
more cooperative towards Europe as regards a politi-
cal solution in Yemen.20 
 
17 Mareike Transfeld, “Iran’s Small Hand in Yemen”, Sada 
(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), 14 February 
2017, http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/67988 (accessed 
23 March 2018). 
18 “Saudi Arabia Designates Muslim Brotherhood Terrorist 
Group”, Reuters, 7 March 2014; see also David Hearst, “Saudi 
Crapshoot in Yemen”, Huffington Post, 28 September 2014 
(updated 27 November 2014), https://www. huffingtonpost. 
com/david-hearst/saudi-high-risk-bet-in-ye_b_5895984.html; 
idem, “Blowback in Yemen: Houthi Advance Is a Saudi 
Nightmare”, Huffington Post, 20 October 2014 (updated 20 
December 2014), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-
hearst/blowback-in-yemen---houth_b_6015990.html (both 
accessed 23 March 2018). 
19 “Iran Violated Yemen Arms Embargo, U.N. Experts Say”, 
New York Times, 12 January 2018. 
20 “Iran Willing to Push for Ceasefire in Yemen with Euro-
pean Powers”, Reuters, 29 May 2018; “Iran Making Efforts to 
End Yemen Crisis”, Tehran Times, 4 May 2018. 
Western Priorities in Yemen: AQAP and 
the Partnership with Saudi Arabia 
After the military intervention began in March 2015, 
the US, UK and France soon declared their readiness 
to provide political and military support. Germany 
did not question the legitimacy of the deployment. 
All four states had already been substantially involved 
within the EU and UN in advocating the negotiation 
and implementation of the GCC Initiative. The US 
and UK assist the coalition with logistics and intel-
ligence, and advise Saudi officers in a joint operations 
centre in the Saudi capital. Among Western coun-
tries, the US is traditionally most involved in Yemen. 
Its priority has been to continue the anti-terrorism 
cooperation in Yemen against AQAP, which has been 
ongoing since 2002. Its commitment since 2011 has 
been devised accordingly; but its involvement in the 
current conflict is counterproductive to its own for-
eign policy goals in Yemen. 
Hadi’s overthrow also deprived 
the US war on terror in Yemen of 
its foundation. 
Hadi’s overthrow also deprived the US war on 
terror in Yemen of its foundation. Although the US 
was able to continue some anti-terrorism operations 
in Yemen even after the coup d’état, it quickly lost 
contact with partners in the Yemeni armed forces, 
which were now under Houthi control.21 In order 
to continue the fight against AQAP, the US threw its 
weight behind Hadi and simultaneously sought con-
tact with the Houthis, who had previously flatly 
rejected Yemeni cooperation with the US in fighting 
AQAP. However, at the same time, the Houthis were 
foregrounding their own fight against the terrorist 
group to justify their advances into southern Yemen, 
which made them seem a natural ally for Washing-
ton. Whilst there was an exchange between the US 
and the Houthis, and whilst some attacks on AQAP 
even looked coordinated, no long-term cooperation 
was established.22 
 
21 Greg Miller and Craig Whitlock, “Yemen Crisis Disrupts 
U.S. Counterterrorism Operations, Officials Say”, Washington 
Post, 23 January 2015. 
22 Bruce Riedel, “Who Are the Houthis, and Why Are 
We at War with Them?”, Markaz, 18 December 2017, https:// 
www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/12/18/who-are-the-
houthis-and-why-are-we-at-war-with-them/ (accessed 28 June 
2018). 
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The US military was unsure about the prospects of 
success for the Saudi-led operation and about whether 
it could be reconciled with the US’s interest in fight-
ing AQAP. There were also doubts as to whether the 
Houthis were really being directed from Tehran. The 
US administration nevertheless declared its support 
for the intervention.23 This should first and foremost 
be seen as a signal to Riyadh that it aimed to continue 
the historically close partnership between the two 
countries – at the time of the intervention, the US 
administration and the EU were negotiating the nu-
clear agreement with the Iranian leadership, and the 
prospects of a rapprochement between the West and 
Tehran were viewed with concern in Riyadh.24 Under 
President Donald Trump, the US position since Janu-
ary 2017 has moved closer to the Saudi position: 
the new US administration also sees the Houthis as 
proxies of Iran. In May 2018 the New York Times re-
ported that US special forces were stationed along 
the Saudi-Yemeni border to pinpoint Houthi missile 
sites.25 Trump also reinforced the US commitment 
against AQAP by increasing drone deployments and 
ground operations. 
The GCC Initiative and the UN’s Efforts 
The UN Secretary-General has been involved in 
Yemen by providing “good offices” since the Moroc-
can Jamal Benomar was appointed special envoy 
(April 2011 – April 2015). Benomar was succeeded 
by the Mauritanian Ismail Ould Cheich Ahmed (April 
2015 – February 2018) and then the Briton Martin 
Griffiths (since February 2018). However, there is no 
explicit mandate from the Security Council or Gen-
eral Council for the UN mission OSESGY in Yemen. 
The GCC Initiative continues to be the authoritative 
framework. UN mediation in Yemen can essentially 
be divided into two phases. The first phase dealt with 
 
23 See, e.g., Mark Perry, “US Generals: Saudi Intervention 
in Yemen ‘a Bad Idea’”, Al-Jazeera, 17 April 2015, http:// 
america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/4/17/us-generals-think-
saudi-strikes-in-yemen-a-bad-idea.html (accessed 23 March 
2018); Doyle McManus, “Why the U.S. Is Courting the 
Houthis Taking Control in Yemen”, Los Angeles Times, 7 Feb-
ruary 2015. 
24 “Saudi Arabia Satisfied with Obama’s Assurances on 
Iran Deal”, Reuters, 4 September 2015. 
25 Helene Cooper et al., “Army Special Forces Secretly Help 
Saudis Combat Threat from Yemen Rebels”, New York Times, 
3 May 2018. 
supporting the political transition process sketched 
out by the GCC Initiative. The second phase, which 
started in April 2015, focused on the special envoy’s 
efforts to persuade the conflict parties to return to 
the political process. 
The GCC Initiative and the Agreement on the Im-
plementation Mechanism for the Transition Process 
in Yemen in Accordance with the Gulf Cooperation 
Council Initiative can be seen as a success for UN 
mediation. Benomar quickly became the main media-
tor in talks, enjoying the backing of the European, US 
and Arab Gulf state embassies. The broad outline of 
the Gulf agreement – namely Saleh’s step-down and 
the formation of a unity government – had already 
been set out by the Gulf Cooperation Council and the 
Yemeni parties. But Benomar worked out the imple-
mentation mechanism with the negotiating parties 
and thus contributed substantially to the accord. In-
terestingly, it was precisely the restraint shown by the 
Security Council members that allowed Benomar to 
present himself as an independent and trustworthy 
mediator in the conflict.26 The US hesitated to take an 
openly anti-Saleh stance for fear of losing a partner in 
the fight against AQAP; Russia shied away from clear 
demands for his resignation as a matter of principle 
in the context of the so-called Arab Spring. 
Agreement was made possible by the fact that a 
balance of power between the regime forces and the 
opposition had emerged in the Yemeni capital in 
autumn 2011. However, the choice of an apparently 
weak consensus candidate – the then-vice president, 
Hadi, from the governing party of many years, the 
General People’s Congress – created for both sides 
the prospect of shaping the transition process in their 
own interest. For Saleh it was obvious that approving 
the agreement would not mean renouncing power 
entirely and that his immunity would allow him to 
remain politically active. Nevertheless, the Security 
Council had to apply pressure before Saleh finally 
consented to sign the agreement. In its Resolution 
2014 of October 2011, the Security Council empha-
sised the express support of the international commu-
nity for the Gulf agreement. US and European threats 
of sanctions against Saleh and his family were also 
effective bargaining tools. 
 
26 Steven A. Zyck, Mediating Transition in Yemen: Achievements 
and Lessons (New York: International Peace Institute, October 
2014) (online), 5, https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
publications/ipi_e_pub_mediating_transition.pdf (accessed 
26 June 2018). 
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Once the agreement had been signed, the special 
envoy, backed by a united Security Council, actively 
accompanied its implementation. The implementa-
tion mechanism of the initiative rested on three pil-
lars: transitional justice, security-sector reform, and a 
National Dialogue to set out the future structure of 
the state and settle the conflicts with the Houthis and 
the Southern Movement. Power-sharing and national 
dialogue had already been used or considered in solv-
ing previous conflicts in Yemen.27 In other words, the 
UN approach built on principles which were already 
familiar in Yemeni politics. That the approach never-
theless failed was mainly due to the formats’ lack of 
inclusiveness, an unrealistic timeframe, attempts at 
sabotage by the elites, and institutions pervaded by 
patronage networks. 
Inclusiveness and Representativeness 
The talks were not sufficiently inclusive from the 
outset and throughout the process. The Gulf states 
and UN negotiated with the leadership of the political 
parties with which the international community was 
already in contact. This made it easier to reach an 
agreement, but actors such as the Houthis, the South-
ern Movement and the independent youth movement, 
who gained in relevance through the nationwide pro-
tests in 2011, were excluded from the agreement. 
These actors could only become involved in the 
political process under the National Dialogue, which 
took place between March 2013 and January 2014. 
The UN funded the talks, provided support for del-
egates, motivated individual representatives to take 
part and took particular care to ensure high levels 
of participation among women. The moderate elite 
camp, which centred on President Hadi, dominated 
the process due to its international support and was 
thus able to co-decide the format and results of the 
dialogue to a large degree.28 The traditional parties 
were represented in greater numbers than new forces. 
However, figures with significant political and mili-
 
27 For example, the 1962 civil war in north Yemen was 
ended five years later by an agreement on power-sharing 
between the tribes and the formation of a five-member 
presidency. The idea of a national dialogue was under con-
sideration by Yemen’s political parties as far back as 2009, 
but failed due to the dominance of the GPC. 
28 Mareike Transfeld, “Political Bargaining and Violent 
Conflict: Shifting Elite Alliances as the Decisive Factor in 
Yemen’s Transformation”, Mediterranean Politics 21, no. 1 
(2016): 150–69 (159ff.). 
tary influence, such as the Houthi leader Abdulmalik 
al-Houthi and the Ahmar and Saleh families, did not 
take part in the conference. This allowed them to ab-
dicate any responsibility for the success (or otherwise) 
of the National Dialogue;29 however, they were largely 
responsible for the escalating violence following the 
conference. 
Although half the delegates were from the south, 
the Southern Movement did not feel represented 
at the forum. It demanded separate talks on Yemeni 
unity as a precondition for its participation in a dia-
logue on pan-Yemeni issues. A few representatives of 
the Southern Movement agreed to attend, often after 
Benomar’s urging. Moreover, many of them were 
associated with Hadi, who hails from the south. Some 
of them were branded traitors for their willingness to 
engage in talks and were unable to return to the south 
after the conference; others were replaced shortly 
before the conclusion of the dialogue by people close 
to Hadi.30 In other words, the forum was neither rep-
resentative nor did it bring together the figures able 
to facilitate real political change in the country. 
The consequences of inadequate inclusiveness 
were particularly clear in the Houthis’ conduct. Due 
to their exclusion from the transition government 
and the conception of the National Dialogue, they 
were able to shun all responsibility for the political 
process. In addition, there was no serious discussion 
either in the run-up to the National Dialogue or 
during the talks themselves about the role of armed 
nonstate actors – or even how to handle them. There 
were calls on the Houthis to found a political party, 
but since they only participated reluctantly in the 
conference, they were never required, for instance, 
to put down their weapons as a precondition. By con-
trast, AQAP as a nonstate violent actor and enemy of 
the Western supporters of the dialogue was explicitly 
excluded. Although the Houthis were able to assert 
many of their interests, they ultimately rejected the 
way in which Yemen was supposed to be divided into 
six federal regions. They used their resistance to this 
key conference outcome as a pretext for military 
expansion and demands for a new, more inclusive 
government. 
The Peace and National Partnership Agreement 
that was subsequently negotiated by Benomar and 
 
29 Author’s interview with delegates of the National Dia-
logue Conference (NDC) in Sana’a, April 2014. 
30 Author’s interviews with NDC delegates in Sana’a in 
April and via telephone, October 2014. 
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signed by the Hadi government and the Houthis on 
22 September 2014 could be seen as an extension of 
the GCC Initiative. It was signed after the Houthis had 
captured the capital by force. The Agreement aimed 
to put an end to the Houthis’ escalation of violence 
through a new power-sharing agreement. According-
ly, it stipulated a new, more inclusive government 
with Houthi and Southern Movement participation, 
along with reforms and the implementation of the 
National Dialogue outcomes.31 However, the Houthi’s 
non-compliance with the agreement was foreseeable. 
Unexpected empowerment and Saleh’s support en-
couraged the Houthis to continue expanding despite 
having signed the agreement, creating new facts on 
the ground. 
An Unrealistic Time Frame 
Following the ten-month-long Dialogue, the 565 del-
egates submitted a catalogue of outcomes in January 
2014, which offered a good basis for a constitution 
with its provisions on issues such as civil rights, edu-
cation and health. The international community 
celebrated the conclusion of the talks as a model 
for a UN-led transition process. However, the formal 
closure of the dialogue merely diverted attention 
from the fact that the actual conflicts had not been 
resolved. Ultimately the conference foundered on 
the southern issue.32 The Southern Movement del-
egates at the dialogue were not representative figures; 
however, no solution could be found for the future 
handling of the south even with those who attended. 
A key outcome of the dialogue was the subdivision of 
Yemen into federal regions to make the distribution 
of state resources more uniform through decentralisa-
tion. However, conference attendees were unable to 
agree on the number or shape of the federal regions. 
The northern-Yemeni elite insisted on a six-region 
solution because the division into two of the resource-
rich south complicates the latter’s quest for independ-
ence. Southern-Yemeni representatives demanded a 
five-state solution and sought to establish one federal 
 
31 Mareike Transfeld, “Houthis on the Rise in Yemen”, 
Sada (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), 31 
October 2014, http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/57087 
(accessed 23 March 2018). 
32 Stephan Day, “The ‘Non-Conclusion’ of Yemen’s 
National Dialogue”, Foreign Policy (online), 27 January 2014, 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/01/27/the-non-conclusion-of-
yemens-national-dialogue/ (accessed 26 June 2018); Trans-
feld, Yemen: GCC Roadmap to Nowhere (see note 2). 
region within the borders of the formerly independ-
ent South Yemen. 
By December 2013 the envisaged time frame for 
the dialogue of six months had already been exceeded 
by three months. Outside the talk forums, tensions 
were rising between the political actors: several mod-
erate delegates were murdered, and violent conflicts 
grew on the periphery between the Islah Party and 
the Houthis. Along with Benomar, Hadi persuaded 
the delegates to sign a document agreeing to a “fairer 
solution for the south”. The decision to divide the 
country into six regions was ultimately confirmed by 
a committee outside of the dialogue, which had been 
appointed by Hadi for that very purpose.33 This cir-
cumvented the National Dialogue with the aim of 
expediting closure – at the cost of a sustainable con-
sensus among the delegates. 
Neither Hadi nor the UN mission nor 
the international sponsors of the GCC 
Initiative acknowledged that the 
Dialogue had missed its objectives. 
It was evidently foreseeable that the Southern 
Movement would reject this solution. The Houthis 
complained about the unfairness of the decision-
making process. They were also dissatisfied with the 
region that they had been allocated, since they sought 
access to the sea. Despite this opposition and the 
growing protests in the south, the transition govern-
ment – backed by the UN – attempted to continue 
the political process on the basis of the Dialogue out-
comes.34 President Hadi’s term in office, which ended 
in February 2014, was extended for a further two 
years by the National Dialogue Conference without 
elections. His legitimacy was subsequently questioned 
throughout the country, with Houthi and Saleh sup-
porters in particular demanding a new government 
ever more emphatically. Armed conflicts also esca-
lated all over Yemen immediately after the conclusion 
of the Dialogue, which therefore merely delayed – 
but did not prevent – the outbreak of violence. Nei-
ther Hadi nor the UN mission nor the international 
sponsors of the GCC Initiative acknowledged that the 
Dialogue had missed its objectives. This has shaped 
 
33 Tobias Thiel, “Yemen’s Imposed Federal Boundaries”, 
MERIP, 20 July 2015, http://www.merip.org/yemens-imposed-
federal-boundaries (accessed 23 March 2018). 
34 Author’s interview with Yemeni politicians in Sana’a, 
April 2014. 
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both their engagement with conflict actors and the 
negotiation formats to this day. 
Resistance to Reform 
The transition government, formed in December 
2011, mainly consisted of Saleh’s GPC and the Islah 
Party. Since the main responsibility for implementing 
the GCC Initiative lay with President Hadi and re-
forms were not going to be discussed until the National 
Dialogue, the transition government barely tried to 
improve the population’s living standards through 
reform efforts of its own. Instead, its members used 
their positions to cultivate patronage networks and 
expand their own power vis-à-vis rivals’. 
The reform of the security sector launched by the 
GCC Initiative was meant to create a national mili-
tary loyal to the state, and not to individual figures. 
Although members of the Saleh family were pushed 
out of their official military positions through the 
threat of sanctions against spoilers contained in Secu-
rity Council Resolution 2051 of June 2012, they con-
tinued to exert influence via informal networks. It 
was almost impossible to institutionalise and profes-
sionalise the security sector, given that it was built 
on patronage networks. Ultimately, only a rearrange-
ment of patronage networks within the institution 
was achieved.35 This enabled Hadi to gain influence 
within the armed forces, but not over the entire secu-
rity sector. 
As a consequence, the Houthis with Saleh’s sup-
port managed to capture the capital in autumn 2015. 
Hadi’s control over the military was too limited to 
deploy it against the Houthis and protect himself 
against the coup d’état. With the Houthis’ accession 
to power, the political transition process and the paci-
fication of conflicts through power-sharing had failed 
under both the GCC Initiative and the Peace and 
National Partnership Agreement. 
Resolution 2216: Partial UN Mediation 
In the second phase of UN mediation, since April 
2015, the Secretary-General tasked his special envoy 
 
35 Peter Salisbury, “You First! DDR, SSR and Yemen’s 
‘Chaos State’”, in Addressing Security Sector Reform in Yemen, 
ed. Heinze (see note 8), 8–13; Adam C. Seitz, “The Tribal-
Military-Commercial Complex and Challenges to Security 
Sector Reform in Yemen”, ibid., 14–21. 
with mediating between the conflict parties to induce 
them to return to the political process within the 
framework of the GCC Initiative, the outcomes of the 
National Dialogue and the relevant UN Resolutions.36 
By this time, the UN mission had already lost most 
of its standing among Yemenis. Jamal Benomar was 
publicly held responsible in Yemen for the failure of 
the political process since his intense commitment 
had made him the face of international support for 
the GCC Initiative.37 Benomar eventually stepped 
down as special envoy in April 2015, after Yemeni 
criticism of his alleged partiality to the Houthis 
became increasingly fierce and even the Gulf states 
turned their backs on him. He was replaced by Ismail 
Ould Cheikh Ahmed.38 Talks between the Hadi gov-
ernment and representatives of the Houthi-Saleh alli-
ance, mediated by the new special envoy, took place 
in June and December 2015 in Geneva and between 
April and August 2016 in Kuwait. They led to an 
exchange of prisoners and several truces. However, 
although different draft agreements were discussed, 
none was concluded. The Hadi government was loath 
to agree to the formation of a new government before 
the Houthis had negotiated their withdrawal and dis-
armament. The Houthis, however, saw a new govern-
ment as the precondition for negotiating the with-
drawal and disarming.39 With the new special envoy, 
there was some hope within the international com-
munity, that the peace talks might gain new momen-
tum. In contrast to his predecessor, Griffiths has 
approached all conflict parties and has been able to 
secure assurances from all parties that they are ready 
to solve the conflict.40 The peace plan he submitted 
in June 2018 provides for a ceasefire as well as the 
 
36 Website of the Office of the Special Envoy of the Sec-
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mandate (accessed 23 March 2018). 
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handover of the Houthis’ medium and heavy weapon-
ry, including long-distance missiles. In return, the 
coalition is to cease its air attacks. A unity govern-
ment is to be formed thereafter.41 After a two-year 
ebb of UN engagement, Martin Griffiths issued invita-
tions to a new round of talks in Geneva to be held 
in the first week of September 2018. While both the 
Houthis and the internationally recognised govern-
ment were supposed to be present at the talks, they 
had no intention of speaking directly to each other, 
but of staying in separate rooms, with Griffiths 
mediating between the two sides to define the frame-
work for the talks. Unfortunately, it did not come 
even this far, as the Houthis did not travel to Geneva 
after their demands had not been met (i.e. that the 
injured and sick be transferred from Sana’a to Oman 
and that the mediators travel to Geneva with an 
Omani plane). Griffiths responded to the failure by 
initiating shuttle diplomacy between Riyadh, Muscat 
and Sana’a.42 However, along with the UN’s failure 
to create the conditions for the Houthis to travel to 
Geneva, a number of factors contribute to the failure 
of UN talks in the Yemen conflict. First, the events 
since mid-2014 have demonstrated the limits of ex-
ternal influence, particularly on the Houthis. Con-
nected to this is the circumstance that the Yemeni 
negotiating parties may not take the UN talks very 
seriously.43 They sent no representatives with real 
influence over military actions. Consequently, the 
truces were short-lived. Second, the UN approach 
based on UN Resolution 2216 of April 2015 rests 
on false assumptions. 
The Limits of External Influence 
When the Security Council stood by Hadi and de-
manded the unconditional withdrawal of the Houthis, 
it took a stance that contradicted the facts on the 
ground. The Houthi coup d’état and the power-shar-
ing arrangement of the Peace and National Partner-
ship Agreement had changed the balance of power 
and shown the Houthi-Saleh alliance that it would 
 
41 “Yemen Peace Plan Sees Ceasefire, Houthis Abandoning 
Missiles”, Reuters, 7 June 2018. 
42 “Yemen Peace Talks Collapse in Geneva after Houthi no-
show”, Reuters, 8 September 2018. 
43 In an interview with the author in Berlin in February 
2017, a high-ranking member of the Houthi political depart-
ment made clear that he considered it important to include 
the Hadi government, but that he was convinced that Presi-
dent Hadi was not interested in resolving the conflict. 
be better off by not acceding to the rules of the GCC 
Initiative. The Houthis now had access to state insti-
tutions, including the military and the state arsenal. 
Simultaneously, through his alliance with the Houthis, 
Saleh attained his objective of disempowering Presi-
dent Hadi and the Islah Party. The narrative promoted 
by the Houthi-Saleh alliance – that the coalition 
intervention was an attack on the Yemeni nation-
state – resonated widely in northern Yemen. 
Meanwhile it had become clear that the Security 
Council had no means at its disposal to change this 
balance of power. During the reforms of the military 
in 2012, the threat of sanctions against Saleh had 
been effective. However, the strong increase of pres-
sure through the creation of a sanctions committee 
in February 2014 already had a less positive impact. 
The looming sanctions neither prevented Saleh from 
entering into an alliance with the Houthis nor the 
Houthis from taking a stance against Hadi and bank-
ing on military expansion. That the UN had little real 
influence on the conduct of the Houthis became clear 
in summer 2014 at the latest, when Benomar repeat-
edly travelled to Saada to persuade the Houthis to 
take part in the political process. An agreement – 
which the Houthis did not comply with – was not 
reached until the Houthis had captured Sana’a and 
thus achieved unprecedented levels of power. 
In November 2014 the Security Council eventually 
imposed sanctions against Saleh and two Houthi com-
manders. For the Houthis, the financial sanctions and 
travel ban were trivial since they neither travelled 
abroad nor depended on foreign bank accounts.44 The 
Saleh family, by contrast, was impacted, since the 
former president had invested his fortune amassed 
over the years abroad and had tried since 2011 to hide 
those riches via transfers to his sons and via an inter-
national financial network.45 However, the sanctions 
did not make Saleh relent. He tried to negotiate for 
them to be lifted, but simultaneously expanded his 
alliance with the Houthis.46 The Security Council had 
thus forfeited its only leverage against Saleh. 
 
44 UN Panel of Experts, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on 
Yemen Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2140 
(2014), S/2016/73, 35. 
45 Ibid., 27ff. 
46 Author’s interview with Yemeni diplomat (Skype), 
20 February 2018. 
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False Assumptions 
A further fundamental problem of the UN approach 
to the talks is that it is based on the parameters of 
Resolution 2216. In UN Resolution 2216 of April 
2015, initiated by the Gulf Cooperation Council, the 
Security Council urged the Yemeni conflict parties 
to return to the framework of the political process, 
assuring both Hadi and the Gulf Cooperation Council 
of its support. It called on the Houthis to withdraw 
immediately and unconditionally from government 
and security institutions and the capital, and refrain 
from actions that belonged to the “legitimate govern-
ment” alone. Moreover, the Security Council imposed 
sanctions against Ahmed Ali Saleh and the Houthi 
leader Abdulmalik al-Houthi, as well as an arms em-
bargo against three Houthi commanders, President 
Saleh and his son. The arms embargo was used 
by Saudi Arabia to legitimise its sea, air and land 
blockade and (after the fact) its intervention.47 
What renders this problematic for the UN talks, is 
that it provides a framework resting on the assump-
tion that the political process could be resumed at the 
point where it had been interrupted by the Houthi 
takeover of power. The UN mission still considered 
the National Dialogue a success and limited his efforts 
to pacifying the conflict between the Houthis and 
the Hadi government so as to be able to continue the 
political process. The negotiating parties thus con-
sisted only of the Hadi government on one side and 
representatives of the Houthis and the GPC on the 
other. However, the UN approach failed to recognise 
that President Hadi enjoyed barely any legitimacy in 
Yemen even at the outset of the military intervention 
and had little influence over the actors there. It also 
ignored the fact that the Southern Movement rejected 
the National Dialogue entirely, did not consider itself 
represented by the Hadi government and did not seek 
 
47 The blockade contributes significantly to the humani-
tarian catastrophe in Yemen. A mechanism introduced by 
the UN to verify ships was supposed to improve the delivery 
of humanitarian goods, but Saudi Arabia was been reluctant 
to relinquish full authority over sea routes to this mechanism. 
“In Hindsight: The Story of the UN Verification and Inspec-
tion Mechanism in Yemen”, see Security Council Report, 1 
September 2016 (online), September 2016 Monthly Forecast, 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/ 
2016-09/the_story_of_the_un_verification_and_inspection_ 
mechanism_in_yemen.php (accessed 10 June 2018). 
to be part of a pan-Yemeni solution.48 The Southern 
Movement was unable to make itself heard at this 
point in time and was excluded from the talks along 
with other forces that had recently emerged or been 
strengthened in the context of the military interven-
tion, such as militia or tribal leaders. 
The binary talk format enabled Saudi Arabia to 
continue to portray itself as a mediator rather than 
a conflict party, by throwing its weight behind Hadi 
as the only legitimate president. The latter thus re-
mained an important element of a political solution 
despite his lack of influence. Simultaneously, Hadi’s 
privileged position in exile in Riyadh now rested on 
continuing the war.49 Following the talks in Kuwait, 
the special envoy and international diplomats for the 
first time considered proposing the disempowerment 
of Hadi as part of an agreement. The plan submitted 
by the UN special envoy in October 2016, for instance, 
mentions this.50 However, the West continues to 
stand by Hadi, as does Saudi Arabia, since his role is 
crucial for the Riyadh-led intervention. Hadi is there-
fore in a position to keep blocking a political solution 
and rejecting proposals that would lead to his dis-
empowerment. 
For the West, good relations 
with Saudi Arabia are 
more important than Hadi. 
For the West, good relations with Saudi Arabia are 
more important than Hadi. This predominant interest 
results in a biased attitude by the UN Security Council 
and other UN institutions, an imbalance that has been 
aggravated by the influence exerted on Security Coun-
cil resolutions by non-permanent members Jordan 
(2014–15), Egypt (2016–17) and Kuwait (2018–19), 
which are also part of the Arab coalition, and by the 
Gulf Cooperation Council itself.51 Saudi Arabia has 
 
48 “How UN Negotiations on Yemen Exclude the South and 
Why That Must Change”, UN Tribune (online), 31 May 2017, 
http://untribune.com/un-negotiations-yemen-exclude-south-
must-change/ (accessed 10 June 2018). 
49 Yara Bayoumy, “Diplomats See Yemen’s Hadi Under-
mining U.N. Peace Talks”, Reuters, 1 December 2015; see also 
Nadwa al-Dawsari, “How Diplomacy Failed in Yemen and 
Why It Will Again”, Washington Post, 11 May 2017. 
50 “New UN Peace Plan for Yemen Leaves Out Hadi”, 
The New Arab, 27 October 2016. 
51 “In Hindsight: Council Action and Inaction on Yemen”, 
Security Council Report, July 2017 Monthly Forecast, http:// 
www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2017-07/ 
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used its influence to prevent an investigation into 
human-rights violations in the Yemen conflict; gain a 
seat on the UN Human Rights Council; and threaten 
the UN with cancelling its financial support if it was 
not removed from the Black List, to which it was 
added for its responsibility for the killing of children 
in Yemen.52 Not least for these reasons, the Houthis 
considered the UN mission to be partial; since June 
2017, they have refused even to meet the special 
envoy Ismail Ould Cheich, who stepped down in 
February 2018. 
The new special envoy, Martin Griffiths, was able 
to resume proceedings with the Houthis and is in 
regular contact with the group’s leaders. Griffiths 
announced at the start of his term in office, however, 
that he would continue to use Resolution 2216 and 
the GCC Initiative as the framework for talks. This 
will dramatically limit his room for manoeuvre, 
including for integrating relevant conflict actors.53 
Nevertheless, Griffiths has begun dialogue with the 
Southern Movement represented by the STC, which 
promises a more inclusive approach. While Griffiths 
vows to continue dialogue, it is as yet unclear whether 
and how the Southern Movement will be integrated 
into the peace process. Although it is a requirement 
for a comprehensive solution, it is debatable whether 
all conflict parties can be integrated into negotiations 
on a new government, with both the internationally 
recognised government and the Houthis vying to 
dominate the peace process. 
Conclusions 
The failure of the UN-accompanied transitional pro-
cess and the subsequent escalation of violence are 
largely due to the interests of the Yemeni conflict 
actors. Each faction of the elite believed that the sus-
tained support it received from domestic and inter-
 
in_hindsight_council_action_and_inaction_on_yemen.php? 
print=true (accessed 23 March 2018). 
52 Human Rights Watch, “UN: Return Saudi-led Coalition 
to ‘List of Shame’”, 8 June 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/ 
2016/06/08/un-return-saudi-led-coalition-list-shame; Owen 
Bowcott, “UK and Saudi Arabia ‘in Secret Deal’ over Human 
Rights Council Place”, The Guardian, 29 September 2015, 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/sep/29/uk-and-
saudi-arabia-in-secret-deal-over-human-rights-council-place 
(both accessed 23 March 2018). 
53 “Griffiths: No Changes in Yemen Peace Talks References”, 
Gulf News, 20 March 2018. 
national allies meant it could sustain its own position 
of power. That the elites, and above all former presi-
dent Saleh, were even able to sabotage the political 
process was due to Saleh’s immunity and the exclu-
sion of important actors by the GCC Initiative. Inter-
national support for Hadi as president of the transi-
tion government strengthened a faction of the elite 
that would have been incapable of asserting itself 
against local actors without external assistance. The 
Houthis and Southern Movement, by contrast, were 
excluded from the negotiations on the Gulf agree-
ment and thus could not contribute to shaping the 
transition process. Both therefore blocked the process 
and created new facts: the Houthis used force to 
expand in the north, while the Southern Movement 
began to eject representatives from northern Yemen 
from the south. The omissions of the GCC Initiative 
ultimately led to the failure of the political process 
and paved the way for a war that is increasingly being 
used by regional and international powers to further 
their own interests. 
The negotiating format of the UN 
special envoy does not do justice to 
the complexity of the conflict. 
The negotiating format of the UN special envoy 
does not do justice to the complexity of the conflict 
since it concentrates on two conflict parties, while 
leaving out other influential actors as well as the 
regional conflict parties. It is also based on the false 
assumption that a return to the political framework 
set out by the GCC Initiative will lead to a pacification 
of the conflict. The actors who currently decide con-
ditions in Yemen are not interested in this political 
process. Moreover, external actors do not have suffi-
cient influence to bring about an agreement in this 
framework, let alone compel the conflict parties to 
comply with it. 
Although both parties reportedly showed them-
selves willing vis-à-vis the special envoy to negotiate, 
neither appears to be willing to compromise. The 
Houthis are unwilling to participate in a process in 
which they stand only to lose. The new escalation of 
violence along the Red Sea after the failure of talks 
in September 2018 shows that the Saudi coalition is 
trying to force the Houthis into a weaker position 
to enable negotiations. The attempts of UN Special 
Envoy Martin Griffiths to bring the parties to the con-
flict back to the negotiation table and his inclusive 
approach are commendable. Whilst Griffiths has 
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already let it be known that he will adhere to Resolu-
tion 2216 and the GCC Initiative, he should neverthe-
less interpret these documents in a way that affords 
him more room for manoeuvre. Resolution 2216 
should be seen as a goal rather than a path. The new 
special envoy should define interim goals that make a 
long-term implementation of the resolution possible. 
Thus, agreements could be concluded in an inclusive 
negotiating setting between local actors, before the 
“big” conflict between the Houthis and the Saudi 
coalitions is resolved. Thus, the Southern Movement 
and representatives of other regions – for example, 
the Hadhramout tribal conference or militia leaders 
from Taiz – could be integrated into a multiforum 
process along with the Hadi government, the GPC and 
the Houthis. First and foremost, the talks format 
should reflect the balance of power in situ and the 
interests of the individual actors. A flexible negotia-
tion format could enable the special envoy to inte-
grate the interests of both local and regional actors 
in different rounds of talks. This will require winning 
over the UAE and Iran along with Saudi Arabia to a 
comprehensive peace process. 
The UN special envoy should also evaluate to what 
extent a resumption of the GCC Initiative process is 
even possible. It would be advisable to concentrate on 
the outcomes of the National Dialogue on which con-
sensus can be reached, leaving out those that have 
contributed to the escalation of the conflict. Specifi-
cally, this concerns the division of the country into 
six regions. Instead of insisting on this point, the spe-
cial envoy should attempt to discuss, within an inclu-
sive talks format, territorial power-sharing based 
on the actual balance of power in Yemen. The basis 
could be a federal system, as the National Dialogue 
stipulated. However, the number and delimitation 
of the federal regions would have to be reviewed in 
a transparent and inclusive process. Competences 
in government and the security sector could then 
be allocated on this basis, and the future of nonstate 
violent actors, including the military wing of the 
Houthis, be negotiated. The biased role of the UN 
Security Council will complicate Griffith’s efforts to 
convince the conflict parties of his impartiality. As 
long as he behaves accordingly when dealing with 
both the conflict parties and Security Council mem-
bers, he could nevertheless succeed. 
Europe should seek a neutral 
approach to the Yemen conflict. 
Europe should seek an impartial approach to the 
Yemen conflict, even if that is complicated by bilat-
eral relations with Riyadh. The EU declaration of 26 
June 2018, calling on all conflict parties to prevent an 
escalation of the violence in Hodeidah, was a positive 
step. But Europe must become more active in pre-
venting further deterioration of the world’s worst 
humanitarian crisis. EU member states must re-assess 
their direct and indirect involvement in the Yemen 
war. Rather than continuing to fan the flames of the 
war by selling arms to the parties of the conflict, they 
should back the EU parliament’s call for an arms em-
bargo against Saudi Arabia and put a stop to weapons 
deals with countries involved in the war.54 Simulta-
neously, Europe should use the talks on Yemen be-
tween the EU, Germany, France, the UK, Italy (EU/E4) 
and Iran, which began in February 2018, to discuss 
what solutions could lead to the Houthis exercising 
moderation.55 The EU should use its influence and 
diplomatic tools to assist the UN special envoy in 
finding the urgently needed political solution to this 
devastating war. In the meantime, the EU must con-
tinue to support local organisations in providing 
humanitarian assistance and security. The disastrous 
humanitarian situation is already degenerating dras-
tically towards a point of no return, with millions 
now at risk of dying of starvation.56 
 
54 “Yemen: MEPs Renew Their Call for an EU Arms Embargo 
against Saudi Arabia”, European-Parliament Press Release, 
30 November 2017, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ news/en/ 
press-room/20171127IPR88940/yemen-meps-renew-their-call-
for-an-eu-arms-embargo-against-saudi-arabia (accessed 24 
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56 “United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humani-
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In the three cases studied here – Libya, Syria and 
Yemen – the UN has tried to mediate power-sharing 
agreements to pacify (Libya, Syria) or avert (Yemen) 
civil wars that had broken out or were looming fol-
lowing Arab Spring protests. However, in none of 
these has the UN special envoy achieved a negotiated 
resolution to the conflict or even effective conflict 
management, or contributed significantly to protect-
ing civilians. Although the UN envoys in Yemen and 
Libya were able to negotiate power-sharing agree-
ments, these did not overcome the political divide 
in Libya or lastingly end armed confrontations in 
Yemen. In Syria, no negotiations on power-sharing 
even took place, merely separate talks between the 
UN mediator and the regime and opposition delega-
tions. 
All three cases have clear parallels regarding con-
flict dynamics and the international context, which 
should be considered the main causes of the lack of 
success in mediation efforts. First, in none of the three 
situations was a stalemate possible, whereby the local 
conflict parties would have preferred a negotiated 
solution to continued armed confrontations, thus 
making the conflict “ripe for resolution”. Instead, 
the local conflict parties were able to rely on external 
support, albeit to varying degrees, which strengthened 
their trust in a military, rather than political, solution 
to the conflict. External backers thus fuelled the con-
flicts even when – as in the case of the US support 
for rebels in Syria – their intention was to enable 
negotiations. Moreover, with time the conflicts be-
came increasingly internationalised, and third parties 
engaged in ever more energetic military interventions 
on the side of one or several conflict parties to pursue 
their own respective objectives. The main conflict 
parties also changed during the conflicts: new actors 
featured, old actors lost relevance; alliances were 
formed and splintered. As a result, the original parties 
in the civil war were not interested in the talks offered 
by the UN to solve the conflict. Nor were negotiations 
between them any longer a meaningful way of ad-
dressing the increasingly complex conflicts. In addi-
tion, the UN missions were not mandated to balance 
the interests of external actors. 
Second, coercive measures that would have put pres-
sure on the conflict parties to agree to a negotiated 
settlement were only used to a very limited extent – 
or not at all, as in Syria due to the Russian veto in the 
Security Council. Where such measures were decided 
by the UN Security Council, they were not consistently 
applied. Responsibility for this lies with the interests 
of external actors. Arms embargoes, for example, 
were undermined by Egypt and the UAE in Libya, and 
only imposed on one conflict party in Yemen, namely 
the Houthi-Saleh alliance. UN sanctions targeting 
those who tried to undermine power-sharing agree-
ments remained a mere threat in Libya and were only 
imposed on one Yemeni conflict party, the Houthi-
Saleh alliance. In any case, their impact was negli-
gible where spoilers, such as the Houthi rebels in 
Yemen, neither travelled abroad nor invested assets 
abroad. The sanctions imposed by the USA and EU 
against conflict parties – for instance representatives 
of the Syrian regime – had an extremely limited 
effect and were also repeatedly circumvented by EU 
member states. Deploying peace-keeping troops to 
accompany and secure the implementation of an 
agreement on conflict resolution was not a realistic 
option in any of the three cases – both because of 
disagreements within the Security Council and be-
cause of the resistance by local conflict parties. 
Furthermore, the approach of the UN mediators 
in Yemen and Libya contributed to the power-sharing 
agreements being short-lived and not resulting in 
pacification. They put excessive time pressure on the 
negotiation of agreements, which led to the conflict 
parties not assuming any personal commitment 
for their implementation and left significant issues 
unresolved. Important conflict actors were left out 
(because of vetoes by regional or major powers or 
controversially being defined as terrorists). The UN 
mediators backed unity governments even when 
the latter turned into parties in the conflict, thus for-
feiting the special envoys’ impartiality. In Syria issues 
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of representativeness and inclusiveness moved into 
the background since no negotiations on power-
sharing took place – or are likely to take place in the 
near future. In all three cases, the mediators focused 
on internationally legitimised objectives, which had 
been rendered unrealistic or obsolete by the changed 
balance of power. In Syria, these objectives were 
power-sharing and a political transition despite the 
fact that the rebels had lost the civil war and been 
pushed back to a few enclaves. In Libya, the UN spe-
cial envoy adhered for far too long to the negotiation 
framework based on the two parliaments, despite 
them no longer representing the increasingly frag-
mented actor landscape. And in Yemen, the UN 
mission stubbornly insisted on the outcomes of the 
National Dialogue Conference as the basis of negotia-
tions and on Hadi as “legitimate” president although 
the latter had barely any support left in the country. 
The approaches pursued by the UN mediators thus 
offered fewer and fewer chances of bringing about a 
negotiated resolution to the conflict. 
On one issue the three cases diverge. In Syria alone 
an external conflict actor has been active since the 
autumn of 2015 who is not only militarily dominant 
but also has the power of veto in the Security Coun-
cil: Russia. The UN mediation therefore cannot cir-
cumvent Russia. This has presented the UN mission 
with a dilemma: it cannot bring about pacification 
without or against Russia, but any cooperation with 
Russia grants legitimacy to an approach that runs 
counter to a resolution to the conflict negotiated 
between the Syrian conflict parties according to Secu-
rity Council Resolution 2254, and violates fundamen-
tal tenets of international law, for example through 
the bombing of civilian targets. In the case of Yemen, 
it is Saudi Arabia that is militarily and politically 
dominant. The Security Council members have allowed 
the Kingdom to largely dictate the rules of engage-
ment in the conflict and a negotiation mandate 
opposed to a negotiated solution that integrates the 
interests of the Houthis and other local actors. 
Clearly, the conclusion from UN mediations in 
Yemen, Libya and Syria that have seen little success 
cannot be that mediation should not even be at-
tempted in similarly complex future conflicts. After 
all, the world community has a duty to act to re-estab-
lish peace and security and protect human lives. The 
issue is therefore how to make such mediation efforts 
more effective even where the circumstances com-
plicate a successful resolution to a conflict. 
Three conclusions can be drawn from the cases 
studied here. First, the mandate should not be limited 
to mediation between local parties in the civil war, 
but also from the outset provide forums that would 
allow for the reconciliation of competing interests 
of all relevant regional or major powers, or at least 
enable the UN to influence the rules of engagement 
in the conflict. As a point of principle, the UN should 
not permit the exclusion of actors based on other 
actors’ vetoes. Second, it must ensure that power-shar-
ing agreements are inclusive, that the representatives 
involved in the negotiations are truly representative, 
and that adhering to agreements is incentivised. All 
these elements should take precedence over a quick 
conclusion. Third, UN mediators must avoid taking 
sides with unity governments generated by power-
sharing agreements when these turn into parties 
in the conflict, circumvent agreements and fuel the 
conflict rather than pacify it. 
The EU and its member states have little influence 
over the regional and global configurations that con-
strain UN mediators. Nevertheless, two general rec-
ommendations can be made. First, Europeans should 
refrain from anything that undermines UN mediation 
efforts, be it through circumventing unilateral or 
multilateral sanctions or through direct cooperation 
with conflict actors not aimed at a negotiated resolu-
tion to the conflict. This is the case, for example, with 
the upgrading of Libyan militia to control sea borders 
to prevent unlawful migration or with arms deliveries 
to Saudi Arabia or Turkey that are not effectively con-
ditioned. Rather, the EU and its member states should 
use their influence to support a negotiated resolution 
to conflicts. This includes making deliberate use of 
any potential influence (through tightening or loosen-
ing sanctions, or granting reconstruction assistance 
or recognition), preferably within the framework of 
broad international coalitions. Second, where UN mis-
sions are not mandated as stipulated to reconcile the 
interests of all relevant regional and major powers, 
Europeans should make use of their own diplomatic 
contacts so as to contribute to regional and inter-
national arrangements that prevent further escalation 
of the war, establish rules of engagement, uphold 
international humanitarian law, and are centred on 
protecting civilians. 
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Abbreviations 
AQAP Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
CARPO Center for Applied Research in Partnership 
with the Orient (Bonn) 
EEAS European External Action Service 
EU European Union 
EuroMeSCo Euro-Mediterranean Studies Commission 
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council 
GNC General National Congress (Libya) 
GPC General People’s Congress (Yemen) 
HoR House of Representatives (Libya) 
HSFK Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konflikt-
forschung (Hessian Foundation for Peace and 
Conflict Research, Frankfurt am Main) 
HTS Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (Levant Liberation 
Committee, Syria) 
ICG International Crisis Group 
IISS International Institute for Strategic Studies 
IS “Islamic State”, also ISIS, ISIL 
ISSG International Syria Support Group 
JCPOA Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
LAS League of Arab States 
LIAM Libyan International Assistance Mission 
MERIP Middle East Research and Information Project 
NDC National Dialogue Conference (Yemen) 
OSE-Syria Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-
General for Syria 
OSESGY Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-
General for Yemen 
PKK Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan  
(Kurdistan Workers’ Party) 
POMEPS Project on Middle East Political Science 
PYD Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat  
(Democratic Union Party) 
SC (UN) Security Council 
SDF Syrian Democratic Forces 
SIG Syrian Interim Government 
SNC Syrian National Council 
SNC Syrian Negotiation Committee 
TGB Transitional Governing Body (Syria) 
UAE United Arab Emirates 
UN United Nations 
UNGA United Nations General Assembly 
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees 
UNSMIL United Nations Support Mission in Libya 
UNSMIS UN Supervision Mission in Syria 
USIP United States Institute of Peace 
(Washington, D.C.) 
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
